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1. Introduction 
 
I have taken the reader on a long journey, from the swirling politics of 1920’s 
Italy, through the turmoil of the second world war, fascism, the Fordism and 
Post-Fordism of post-war Britain, to the end of the exhausted Blair-Brown 
project of the British Labour party. I am keen now to see what remains of 
left state theorising as writers continue to struggle with these same theories of 
the state, the same questions concerning the future of capitalism, and the 
issue of progress in human societies. I want to canvass a series of question 
here in this last chapter – how has this theory of the state – the theory that 
explains how the mad ride of capitalism has survived revolution, dissent, 
corruption, chaotic mismanagement and hopeless inefficiencies, not to 
mention ruthless competition and deregulation – how has it survived? Do 
these theories of the state have anything still to say about the present 
condition of what Hall called ‘late-late capitalism’, and, if they do, what kind 
of theories now seem operative, useful in explaining what is going on, and 
predictive of future events. This is an especially pertinent question, since, 
after an extended period of neoliberal rule, both in the U.K. and in the 
United States, as well as elsewhere, one might reasonably ask the question as 
to what role the state can possibly play, now that the state has been cut back, 
dismissed, attacked and replaced by market forces in so many areas.1 Or, 
                                                     
1 This is perhaps one of the greatest delusions of neoliberalism.  The first step Donald 
Trump took after taking office in 2017 was to try to appoint 10,000 new federal 
officers to deal with immigration issues.  In commenting on the Thatcher régime of 
the 1970s, the Economist wrote : ‘She was also an enemy of big government who 
presided over a huge expansion of it.’ (Recovered from http://www.economist.com/ 
blogs/blighty/2013/04/margaret-thatcher-0, February 23, 2017).  The right-wing 
Cato Institute commented about Reagan that : ‘Reagan failed to radically reduce the 
size of government. The 1981 budget eliminated one program: the Comprehensive 
Employment Training Act of 1974, a public sector employment boondoggle that had 
grown rapidly under Carter. Budget experts John Cogan and Timothy Muris 
discovered that overall domestic discretionary spending (including defense spending 
but not entitlements) grew only slightly less than the inflation rate during Reagan’s 
presidency. By 1989, such spending almost equaled its 1981 level, adjusted for 
inflation. Initial cuts were followed by spending increases. Spending by the 
Department of Education, for example, which Reagan had promised to eliminate in 
1980, rose by 14 percent during his two terms after being reduced in 1981. Between 
1980 and 1987, the three largest entitlements (Social Security, Medicare, and 
Medicaid) increased their spending by 84 percent, a total of $145 billion.’  (Recovered 
from https://www.cato.org/policy-report/marchapril-2010/limiting-government-
1980-2010 on February 23, 2017.) 
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indeed, are we now in a period beyond theories of the state, and the era of 
the state itself? Does the future seem to be stateless, and, if not, what account 
can we give of the future of the state and state theory? Does utopia still exist 
somewhere on the theoretical horizon? 
 
Of course, this long, confused, awkward and unsettling discussion of the 
state was always really about utopia. It was always about the pathway out of 
despair, poverty, misery and disharmony to a more egalitarian world, in 
which some form of justice, security and harmony might prevail. The path 
forward usually involved the state as the agent of social progress, and the 
only agent capable of taking on the ‘forces of reaction’ – the feudal landlords, 
the capitalists, the apathetic and the cynics, the military and the police, and all 
those who opposed the furtherance of justice for the dispossessed, and there 
were many. In order to think about that state and socialism, theorists of the 
state had always to hope for a utopia somewhere in the future. Do they still 
think about this future, and does the state still play a part in their thinking? 
To form an answer, I examine the work of Erik Olin Wright, who has been 
working on the issue of progressive utopias for some time, and continue with 
Pierre Bourdieu’s monumental work on the State, before ending with some 
very recent formulations, in the work of Jules Boykoff, Naomi Klein and 
George Monbiot. 
2. Erik Olin Wright and Utopia 
The American sociologist Erik Olin Wright has long been interested in 
Marxist theories of the state, and early on paid close attention to the work of 
Nicos Poulantzas. More recently, he has paid close and extended attention to 
utopias. Completing his doctorate at Berkeley in 1976, he was initially 
influenced and radicalized by the experience of the Vietnam War, and the 
protests that resulted around that war. His first book, The Politics of 
Punishment,2 comprised an analysis on the American prison system. He starts 
with a striking paragraph : 
If you are a typical American citizen, chances are that in your life you have 
committed some crime for which you could have been sent to jail or prison. 
In all probability, you have stolen something from a store, cheated on your 
income tax, or committed some other punishable offense. Similarly, as a 
typical American citizen, chances are that you have been the victim of a 
crime. Your house has been burglarized, your car has been stolen, or you 
have been cheated by a fraudulent repairman. If you are an American citizen 
                                                     
2 Wright, Erik Olin (1973). The Politics of Punishment: a critical analysis of prisons in America. 
New York: Harper & Row.  
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who is poor, chances are that you have been the victim of crime many times.3 
For Wright, the politics of crime is a direct result of the political decision to 
establish and maintain a social structure that exhibits dramatic differences in 
power and wealth among its community members.4 This early work 
foreshadows two major themes that propelled much of Wright’s work for the 
following years – social class and inequality, on the one hand, and the role of 
the state in structuring society on the other. Of course, in much Marxist 
work, themes of class and state are tightly connected, and they are in Wright’s 
work. In this early work, there is a clear structuralism in Wright’s formulations. 
The state decides certain policies, and the result is social inequality or crime, 
or uneven experiences of crime according to class. This is perhaps too crude 
a caricature of Wright’s work, even at this early stage, and the book is a 
wonderful account of a problem that would challenge leftist writers for years 
to come,5 and it has much subtlety and thoughtfulness in its pages. 
Nonetheless, the relation between the state, social class and rates of 
punishment is unambiguous : 
Prisons in the United States are primarily used to punish those crimes, such 
as burglary, robbery, and assault, which are typically committed by the lower 
classes. The result is that prisons in this country are disproportionately filled 
with the poor and the uneducated.6 
Wright claims that most of American crime is conducted by those in the 
wealthier classes, but that these crimes, which are relatively safe to commit, 
and which are shielded from the public eye, are rarely sanctioned. The text is 
heavily documented with evidence, tables and statistics. What follows is a 
detailed account of life in San Quentin Prison7 that Wright gathered during a 
year of visiting. Wright described the régime in such institutions as ‘Liberal 
Totalitarianism’.8 Liberal goals were merged with totalitarian control over the 
lives of prisoners. Racism seemed to be a fundamental issue, but it was not 
the only source of trouble. There is a harrowing account of life in solitary 
isolation by Thomas Lopez Meneweather,9 followed by stories of attempted 
murder, and a picture of relentless and brutal violence and prejudice emerges. 
                                                     
3 Op. cit., page 3.  
4 Ibid., page 4. 
5 See, for example, at Berkeley again, Wacquant, Loïc, (2009) Deadly Symbiosis: Race and 
the Rise of Neoliberal Penality. Cambridge: Polity Press.  
6 Wright, 1973, pages 25-26. 
7 A prison located near San Francisco, which Wright visited as a prison chaplain 
during 1970 and 1971.   
8 The title of Chapter Seven. 
9 Chapter Nine, 
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Wright concludes with a chapter that connects prisons with broad structures 
of social class and inequality, and with the state.10 While there is hardly a 
theory of the state in operation here, there is clearly a marxisant undercurrent 
shaping the writing. 
 
In Class, Crisis and the State11 Wright spread his wings. The book was to be 
instrumental in marking him out as a leading Marxist intellectual in American 
sociology at a time when Marxism was gaining acolytes in the wake of the 
Vietnam War. And here we see a deep concern with the writing of Nicos 
Poulantzas, and especially his theory of social class. This concern with social 
class was to lead Wright to undertake a massive international project on class 
structure.12 He also sets out an original theory of the state. Again, this is a 
straightforward structural Marxism to begin with. The purpose of the work is 
to reveal the underlying structures that shape the world of appearances.13 
What follows is a detailed exposition of the Poulantzas-inspired theory of 
social class. Wright begins : 
All Marxists agree that manual workers directly engaged in the production of 
physical commodities for private capital fall into the working class.14  
While this may be true, thus solving one of the great problems of class 
theory, it is hardly the whole story. This is because, Wright comments, social 
classes are ‘real social forces and they have real consequences’.15 Where, 
therefore, do the boundaries of the classes reside? To answer this question, 
Wright is guided by Poulantzas’s Classes in Contemporary Capitalism.16 He begins 
by setting out the main elements of the Poulantzian argument.17 First, classes, 
for Poulantzas, are defined through class struggle. Classes are not just boxes 
or pigeon holes into which people can be placed. Second, at the same time, 
however, classes designate objective positions in the social order. These 
                                                     
10 Wright, page 313. 
11 Verso, 1978, New York. 
12 In the 1980s, I was the New Zealand project director in Wright’s program. 
13 There are systematic references to Althusser and to structuralist theory here.  It 
appears Wright’s attempt is to develop a logic of causality from this form of theory, 
and to thus render the work available for empirical work.  Indeed on pages 15ff., 
Wright explicitly sets out to diagram some of the ‘structured totalities’ embodied in 
Althusser’s writing.  In this diagramming of Althusserian structuralism, Wright also 
start to fashion his theory of the state. 
14 Ibid., page 30. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Op. cit.  
17 I have discussed this theory at great length in the section on Poulantzas, so the 
briefest of accounts will suffice here.  Wright’s account runs from pages 32 to 61. 
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positions exist independent of the will of the agents that fill these positions. 
The method by which these positions are reproduced he refers to as ‘the 
structural determination of class’.18 Finally, classes exist at the economic, 
political and ideological levels. This latter breakthrough in thinking gained 
from Poulantzas will prove crucial in Wright’s later elaboration of the class 
structure. 
 
Wright is especially intrigued by Poulantzas’s attempt to define the new petty 
bourgeoisie. Traditionally, the petty bourgeoisie were easy enough to find – 
they comprised the self-employed. Small farmers, shopkeepers, and self-
employed artisans filled this category. Historical change had meant the 
reduction of numbers of people in this category, but, in the Poulantzian view, 
they have been replaced by an emerging group of ‘new petty bourgeoisie’. 
This new group are separated from the workers because of their engagement 
in mental work, rather than manual labour. At the same time, this new 
category share ideological similarities with the old petty bourgeoisie. This 
new class is both dominated by capital, and is in a position to dominate the 
working class. This comprises the political position of the new petty 
bourgeoisie. Ideologically this class is also separated from the working class 
because of their access to ‘secret knowledge’, an entire range of experts 
knowledgeable about the process of production. They thus constitute a class 
in domination over the working class, even while they are, at the same time, 
dominated by capitalist interests.19 The major element that brings the old and 
the new petty bourgeoisie together is ideology. A common set of values is 
there in each case, according to Poulantzas – a belief in individualism, careers 
and upward mobility ; reformism, the renovation of the system through 
politics ; and a belief in what Poulantzas calls ‘power fetishism’, the notion 
that the state is an inherently neutral force that can steer society forward in a 
productive way, and mediate between classes. Wright concludes with an 
assessment of the bourgeoisie themselves. Here he is at pains to distinguish 
between ownership and possession.20 This is important because Wright wants 
to pull out managers from owners in the class structure. Poulantzas argues 
that managers and capitalists both belong in the bourgeoisie. But in large 
companies especially, managers often have possession of the means of 
production, that is, the capacity to direct production, without being owners 
of the company. Poulantzas nonetheless insists that owners and managers 
comprise a single bourgeois class. In addition, state managers, while not 
directly managing capital, are said to belong to the bourgeois class because 
                                                     
18 Ibid., page 33. 
19 Ibid., page 39. 
20 Ibid., page 42. 
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they direct the state in the interests of capital.21 
 
Wright disagrees on three counts – there are problems in defining productive 
labour ; there is a lack of correspondence between productive and 
unproductive labour and actual position in the labour force ; there is a lack of 
fundamental difference in economic interest between productive and 
unproductive workers.22 In his assessment of the political and ideological 
criteria, he is unhappy with the exclusion of individuals who do not, on all 
criteria, and not just the economic, line up with the proletariat. This is because 
Poulantzas appears to give equal status to the ideological and political 
dimensions of class in comparison with the economic.23 This is a plausible 
judgement. If we take Poulantzas at his word, and the economic is to be 
considered determinant in the last instance, then these criteria cannot be 
awarded equal status. Nor is Wright happy with Poulantzas’s use of political 
criteria ; indeed Wright wants to claim that the theoretical strategies Poulantzas 
uses are not political at all. And as far as ideology is concerned, Wright is not 
satisfied with the mental/manual division of labour as the sole criterion in 
use.24 Wright then goes on to examine the empirical consequences of 
Poulantzas’s theorizing, and especially the size of the working class. His 
conclusion is that if we take Poulantzas’s theoretical criteria for the working 
class seriously, then the American proletariat is reduced to a small minority.25 
 
When he turns his attention to the petty bourgeoisie, he sees that Poulantzas 
relies entirely on ideological criteria to bring the old and the new petty 
bourgeoisie together, when it is clear that their economic position is different. 
And in terms of the bourgeoisie themselves, he is not willing to throw the 
managers in with the owners. On any plausible theoretical grounds, this 
distinction does not stand scrutiny. The debate centres on ownership and 
possession. When managers own part of the business, then perhaps owners 
and managers can be clumped together. But when possession and ownership 
are separate, this common class position is not well founded. Furthermore, 
claims Wright, economic ownership and possession are not black and white 
categories ; each of them is subject to gradations and ambiguities.26 
 
As an alternative, Wright develops a model of class structure in which he 
proposes the category of ‘contradictory class locations’ existing between the major 
                                                     
21 Ibid., page 43. 
22 Ibid., page 46.  These arguments are then set out in detail in pages 46-50. 
23 Ibid., page 51. 
24 Ibid., page 53. 
25 Ibid., page 58. 
26 Wright, op. cit., pages 60-61. 
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classes.27 Along with the bourgeoisie, the proletariat and the petty 
bourgeoisie, the contradictory class positions include small employers, semi-
autonomous wage earners, and managers and supervisors. He then makes an 
assessment of the size of each class and contradictory class location in the 
United States, concluding that such a strategy yields a very small bourgeois 
class of 1-2%, a proletariat of between 41% and 54%, and a petty bourgeoisie 
of about 4.5%, with contradictory categories making up the rest. 
 
This is a far more politicist reading than Poulantzas would have allowed. 
Wright’s vision of the class structure employs three criteria – ‘control of 
labour power, control of the physical means of production and control of 
investments and resources’.28 If control is all that is at work, then while 
economics is implicit in each criterion, the ideological dimension seems to 
have disappeared entirely. Only when discussing ‘Employees in political and 
ideological apparatuses’29 do ideological elements come to the fore. There is 
also an implicit instrumentalist theory of the state at work here, to which we 
shall return to below.30 The account is profoundly structuralist, focusing 
primarily on the occupation of certain positions within the class structure.31 
He corrects himself immediately, of course, reminding us that class struggle is 
the most important dimension of the class system,32 but in a sense the damage 
has already been done. The class structure has been set out before this 
discussion occurs. All this analytical work is important, Wright concludes, 
because finding out the boundary of the working class enables us to see the 
possibilities for socialism.33 Understanding the dimensions of the contradictory 
class locations enables us to understand the work needed to be done in a 
revolutionary situation to draw such elements into the class struggle.34  
 
In chapter five, Wright fully reviews leftist theories of the state. We are again 
in the realm of utopias. The focus here is on socialist strategies, and we begin 
with Lenin, and his notion that bourgeois democracies were ‘mere talking 
shops.35 Since bureaucracies were obstructive to the interests of the working 
class, then the only way forward was the smashing of the state. Since Lenin’s 
                                                     
27 The diagram setting these structure out is to be found on page 63. 
28 Wright’s phrase, page 87. 
29 Ibid., page 94. 
30 Ibid., page 95. 
31 Ibid., page 97.  The word ‘occupy’ occurs six times on page 97 as Wright summarizes 
his position on classes. 
32 See pages 98ff. 
33 Ibid., page 108. 
34 Ibid., page 109. 
35 Ibid., page 226. 
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time, state monopoly capitalism has emerged and Eurocommunist parties 
have been willing to become involved in state activities, as we have seen 
above in the case of New Times. Wright’s particular interest is to see if the 
state apparatus can be used to destroy the capitalist state itself.36 Wright 
reviews the social-democratic compromise of the post-war era as a 
mechanism for arriving at socialism one policy at a time, a form of socialist 
incrementalism. Such a view implicitly suggests that the state is a neutral 
instrument that can be used by working class interests to secure advantages, 
if not revolution. Wright takes Lenin’s position to be that, while involvement 
with the state and democratic elections might be useful in educating the 
working class, the state must, in the last instance, be smashed as being 
fundamentally inimical to the interests of the broad masses.37 In Wright’s 
reasoning, the structure of the social democratic state makes it impossible for 
the capitalist state to achieve socialist ends. It may be possible, he surmises, 
for a social democratic government of the left to shift the structure of the 
state to such a degree that the shape of the state is altered, and the ‘class 
selectivity’ of the state is also changed. Such changes might also alter the very 
nature of the class structure itself.38 But this seems unlikely in the United 
States, and Wright confesses to lacking the knowledge to comment on 
Europe.39 For Wright, the fundamental interests of the working class in 
revolution have usually been replaced by the need to respond to immediate 
interests through the ballot box. Can this be changed, given the challenges 
now (in 1978) facing the capitalist system? The development of the welfare 
state had made this more likely since now labour power has become 
somewhat less commodified.40 But at the same time, many women had 
entered the workforce since World War Two, and thus their labour had 
become more commodified. Nonetheless, the rise of the welfare state does 
offer some opportunities. Second, it is clear that the global economic crisis 
will require additional state intervention for the ‘problem to be solved’, and 
this offers further political opportunities. And : 
Whereas Lenin could refer to the bureaucratic personnel as tied to the 
bourgeoisie “through a thousand threads”, which guaranteed their loyalty to 
the capitalist class, the class character of state bureaucratic positions can no 
                                                     
36 Ibid., page 227. 
37 See pages 228-229, and especially footnotes 5.  There are hints of Wright’s interest 
in scientific socialism, and this may refer to Althusser’s theoretical schemings.  See 
especially footnote 8, page 231. 
38 Ibid., page 232. 
39 Wright accepts the implausibility of such a strategy in the United States in footnote 
11.  
40 Ibid., page 235. 
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longer be characterized in such a simple manner.41 
The key, Wright argues, is for state workers to be organized around a certain 
set of political demands, such as better social services, better schools, and so 
on.42 In the end, the question comes down to whether a left government can 
help organize the political capacities of the working class. Here Poulantzas 
makes his first appearance as the theorist of the ‘power bloc’, the state 
organising the ruling class while disorganizing the working class.43 Can the 
state change direction so that the working class are no longer fractured, but 
rather organized? This Poulantzian theme colours the pages that follow.  
 
At the same time, the grip of bourgeois hegemony must be loosened. Again, 
this language gestures towards Gramsci and Poulantzas, but no reference is 
made. This speaks to the issue of fighting for the national common sense, an 
argument that Hall was later to take so seriously. Without a loosening of this 
hegemony, and an alternative hegemony being developed from below, it 
seems unlikely to Wright that any revolutionary change is possible. Wright 
ends the chapter with consideration of the ‘Problem of Repression’.44 Here 
he argues that while the first forms of resistance to change from the 
bourgeoisie might involve economic resistance, the fact that the state is now 
so widely embedded in economic relations would limit this capacity. What, 
then, are the possibilities for armed resistance in such circumstances? This 
will depend on the specific conditions that might prevail. If the repressive 
state apparatus is fragmentary, as in Cuba, China or Russia, then working 
class control might be possible. If, on the other hand, as in Chile, the military 
side unambiguously with the ruling class, repression will be used to head off 
changes to the left.45 Thus, whether the state can ever be used to bring about 
a socialist revolution still hangs in the air.  
 
For the next few years, Wright continued with his work on income inequality 
and social class.46  And in Reconstructing Marxism,47 Wright revisited the topic 
                                                     
41 Ibid, page 239. 
42 See pages 240-241. 
43 Ibid., page 241. 
44 Ibid., pages 249-252. 
45 Ibid., page 251. 
46 See, for example, his Class Structure and Income Determination, Academic Press, 1979, 
Cambridge, Mass.  See also a wide range of further publications, and especially Classes, 
Verso, New York, 1985 ; The Debate on Class edited by Erik Wright, Verso, New York, 
1989 : Interrogating Inequality, Verso, New York, 1994 ; and Class Counts, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1997, as well as many articles and other publications. 
47 Reconstructing Marxism ; essays on Explanation and the Theory of History, by Erik Olin 
Wright, Andrew Levine and Elliott Sober, Verso, New York, 1992. 
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of socialist strategy and socialist futures. In a brief excursus, Wright and his 
co-workers start by suggesting the Marxist project appeared largely spent : 
We do not think that there is any reason, in general, to support … 
comprehensive claims of class primacy, and in any case, the legitimacy of the 
distinctively Marxist emancipatory project does not depend on class 
oppression being more “fundamental” than other forms of oppression.48 
The dual problem for Marxism at that moment, as the writers see it, is, first, 
the ‘stagnation and decay of authoritarian state socialist societies’,49 but second, 
the failure of the ‘strong’ historical classical materialist project. This latter 
project now seems to them at an end : 
While the traditional model no longer seems tenable, even in principle, many 
Marxist intellectuals are unhappy with the emerging alternative – a social 
theory with less ambitious explanatory scope and with less certainty about its 
explanatory capabilities. The sense of crisis that results reflects a deep 
ambivalence over the implications of this transformation of a comprehensive 
emancipatory theory to a more restricted account of particular social 
processes and tendencies.50 
The book ends on a note of profound political pessimism, and there is little 
talk of utopia – indeed, the end of utopian thinking seems to be implied. Nor 
is there any advanced theorising on the state, nor any political program 
proposed that might bring about a coalition of interests based on ethnicity, 
gender and class – the multiple oppressions theory that is hinted at towards 
the end. 
 
In Interrogating Inequality,51 the utopian current is revisited, however. Wright 
comments : 
For well over a century, those who have dreamed of a world in which 
inequalities of material well-being have been drastically reduced or even 
eliminated have looked to socialism as a way of accomplishing this goal.52 
In ‘Capitalism’s Futures’, Wright rehearses some possibilities for the future of 
capitalist societies. Certainly here there is much consideration of a statist 
                                                     
48 Ibid., page 188. 
49 Ibid., pages 189-190, their phrase. 
50 Ibid., page 191. 
51 Interrogating Inequality : essays on class analysis, socialism and Marxism, Verso, New York, 
1994. 
52 Ibid., page 109. 
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society, in which the future might rest in the hands of bureaucrats,53 and 
various forms of possible socialist and quasi-socialist futures are imagined – 
state capitalist production ; workers’ self-management production ; socialist 
production ; party-bureaucrat socialist production ; and market socialism.54 
Many diagrams and tables follow as each form of future is examined. 
Wright’s conclusions are that if his reasoning is sound, then historical 
materialism itself will need to shift ground. If there are many possible paths 
to the future, then the linear models of the past must be rejected.55 Wright 
finally argues that socialists must be much more conscious of the alternatives 
they are proposing, and especially pay attention for the need to be radically 
democratic.56 There is no mention here of the multiple oppressions theory 
that had raised its head earlier in Reconstructing Marxism. The debate stays 
strictly within the socialist agenda. But later, in ‘Explanation and 
Emancipation in Marxism and Feminism’, the two sources of oppression are 
jointly considered. Yet he does not conclude with any serious political 
proposals for a joint future. In Deepening Democracy57, however, Wright turns 
back to a consideration of the broader political questions of the future. The 
state seems at first to be central to these concerns : 
As the tasks of the state have become more complex and the size of polities 
larger and more heterogeneous, the institutional forms of liberal democracy 
developed in the nineteenth century – representative democracy plus techno-
bureaucratic administration – seem increasingly ill-suited to the novel 
problems we face in the twenty-first century.58 
‘Beyond the State’ might easily be the title of this book at first glance. What 
follows are case studies in democracy and emancipation in four communities 
– neighbourhood governance in Chicago ; habitat conservation in the United 
States ; participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre, Brazil ; and democratic 
reforms in West Bengal and Kerala, India.59 The authors continue with a 
detailed account of these projects and a theoretical proposal – what the 
authors refer to as ‘Empowered Participatory Governance,’ which they 
suggest is a ‘model of deliberative democratic practice.’60 The elements of 
‘EPG’ are to focus on specific tangible problems ; to involve ordinary people 
                                                     
53 Pages 133ff. 
54 This list appears on page 139. 
55 Ibid., page 154. 
56 Ibid., page 155. 
57 Deepening Democracy, : Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance, by 
Archon Fung and Erik Olin Wright, Verso, New York, 2003. 
58 Ibid., page 3. 
59 These projects are listed on page 5. 
60 Ibid., page 15. 
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close to these problems ; and to produce solutions to these problems.61 This 
strategy, in turn, is based on three principles : 
(1) the devolution of public decision authority to empowered local units, (2) 
the creation of formal linkages of responsibility, resource distribution, and 
communication that connect these units to each other and to superordinate, 
centralized authorities, (3) the use and generation of new state institutions to 
support and guide these decentered problem-solving efforts.62  
The state appears to be creeping back in here, but it is the state being built 
from the bottom, rather than a state developing from some abstract higher 
authority. Alternative strategies are outlined, and the advantages of EPG are 
indicated. Wright and Fung are suggesting a new form of state : 
Since empowered participatory governance targets problems and solicits 
participation localized in both issue and geographic space, its institutional 
reality requires the commensurate reorganization of the state apparatus. It 
entails the administrative and political devolution of power to local action 
units – such as neighborhood councils, personnel in individual workplaces, 
and delineated natural habitats – charged with devising and implementing 
solutions and held accountable to performance criteria. The bodies in the 
reforms below are not merely advisory, but rather creatures of a transformed 
state endowed with substantial public authority.63  
The new approach requires us to rethink our politics and establish, instead of 
the old models, a permanent64 systems of grassroots politics. The attempt 
here is to get the existing state involved : 
A … characteristic of these experiments is that they colonize state power and 
transform formal governance institutions.65 
Thus, the authors argue, these are less radical approaches than those who 
wish to ‘fight the power’, but they are more radical in that they wish to secure 
the resources of the state to bring changes about. The hope is to keep an 
enduring culture of participation alive, and not have such activities be a one-
issue phenomenon after which power is dissolved back into the isolated, 
centralised state. 
 
What results, the authors continue, is, following John Stuart Mill, a better 
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form of outcome for the community, and a better quality of citizen, 
measured by their level of knowledge and their degree of participation in the 
political process to arrange the delivery of public goods. The authors 
conclude that the new strategy will not work in all social and political settings. 
However, in the contemporary world of so-called democratic societies, belief 
in the institutions of social democratic management is at an all-time low, and 
there is an urgent need to revitalise these institutions : 
We believe that this decline in confidence in the democratic affirmative state 
does not reflect an actual exhaustion of democratic potential but rather the 
political triumph of antistatist neoliberalism. While ultimately a revitalization 
of democratic institutions on a wide scale requires political mobilization, that 
challenge also requires new visions for how democratic institutions can 
advance urgent social goals.66  
A large section of the book then considers each of the aforementioned 
political experiments in turn. Then a series of commentaries by other authors 
are presented before the authors draw some conclusions in their epilogue. 
Here they seek to examine further the preconditions for participatory power 
that might enable fruitful local political involvement to occur.67 A central 
notion is the concept of counter-vailing power – how it is possible to 
establish a power base to compete with the existing powers structures?68 The 
authors then establish a typology of power in which the governance structure 
and the character of decision-making are the variables.69 Governance can be 
top down or participatory ; decision-making can be adversarial or 
collaborative. ‘Empowered Participatory Governance’ (EPG) is clearly that 
form of politics that is participatory and collaborative. They conclude with a 
hopeful message : 
The chorus of support in favor of participatory collaboration is growing. Its 
natural constituents are local organizations … Pressed from below by these 
sources and perhaps also by the disappointments of their own approaches, 
leaders of national adversarial organizations may eventually accept the 
limitations of top-down governance strategies. When they do so, they may 
begin to make the difficult transformations of scale, competence, and 
political framing necessary for them to become effective actors in 
participatory collaborative governance schemes.70  
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The hope clearly is that ‘emerging governance structures’71 will evolve to 
shape and support these new endeavours. Thus there is a sense of optimism, 
of hopefulness for a better political future, and a gesture towards a new state 
theory – the colonization of the local state, at least, by the participatory 
actions of local citizens, thereby to secure a better provision of public goods. 
 
The account is at one and the same time interesting, sometimes exciting, and 
simultaneously disappointing. Most interestingly, there is no harking back to 
Marx, or to Lenin, or even to more recent writers such as Poulantzas. Indeed, 
the break with orthodox leftism is almost entirely complete. Instead, the 
foundational authors named in the text are John Stuart Mill and John Dewey. 
The theory of Left Statism has now moved into the shadows. Some of the 
case studies are hopeful, hardly utopian since they actually occurred, but 
hopeful in their suggestion that ideas can work in actually existing 
democracies and in other contexts. There is a darkening gloom, though, 
hanging over the text. It is there particularly in the criticisms that the authors 
themselves propose, and it is reinforced and extended by the critical authors 
that add to the original thesis with further complications and obstacles, 
difficulties and complaints. It remains, nonetheless, utopian in character, 
utopian in the best way, in that it can show concrete examples of successful 
projects.  
 
In ‘The Real Utopias Project’, Wright deals with future possibilities head-on. 
Wright tells us he turned to the question of utopias in 1992, after the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the declaration of the ‘End of 
History’. The attempt, he tells us, was to deepen the discussion of alternatives 
to the existing relations of power, inequality and privilege. In Envisioning Real 
Utopias72 he comments : 
 
There was a time, not so long ago, when both critics and defenders of 
capitalism believed that “another world was possible.” It was generally called 
“socialism.” While the right condemned socialism as violating individual 
rights to property and unleashing monstrous forms of state oppression, and 
the left saw socialism as opening up new vistas of social equality, genuine 
freedom and the development of human potentials, both believed that a 
fundamental alternative to capitalism was possible. 
Most people in the world today, especially in its economically developed 
regions, no longer believe in this possibility. Capitalism seems to be part of 
the natural order of things, and pessimism has replaced the optimism of the 
will that Gramsci once said would be essential if the world was to be 
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transformed.73 
 
Wright then draws out details of four examples of utopias - participatory city 
budgeting ; Wikipedia ; the Mondragon worker-owned cooperatives ; and the 
notion of unconditional basic income – to illuminate his argument. The 
answer to the traditional utopian question – what should society look like - 
has long had an obvious and simple form from the left, so simple and so 
obvious that it is hardly worth repeating. What is the alternative to 
capitalism? The answer is socialism. What is the mechanism? The mechanism 
is the state. But given the neoliberal revolution of the 1980s, the state is no 
longer trusted, and socialism is a long-forgotten relic of thinking from the 
historic past. The natural state of neoliberal capitalism is now accepted 
worldwide, and the theories of the state that so captured the imagination of 
an earlier generation, because they seemed to explain the mechanisms of the 
future, are now redundant. These socialist, large-scale arguments founder, as 
Wright points out, on the ‘fatal conceit’ proposed by Hayek, that rational 
planning can produce a perfect, or at least a better, society. Of course, the 
Left reject such critiques and still argue that a socialist transformation is 
possible. But both sides of the argument still belief that things can and 
should be improved. His impulse is to overcome the cynicism that surrounds 
the present situation, and suggest options.  
 
Wright then sets out the case against capitalism, and its systematic structuring 
of a variety of forms of oppression. Most of this is familiar territory to those 
on the left, but perhaps the various strands of complaints that routinely 
flavour the leftist discourse are usefully brought together here to make the 
case more powerfully than usual.74 Then Wright turns to alternatives, and 
Marx is again disinterred and brought back from the graveyard in Highgate to 
do his turn again. Wright sets out the Marxist project in five major theses. He 
then points out inadequacies – where would we be if we could not find errors 
in the old boy’s writings? This is an essential starting point in all the writings 
we have reviewed to date, and Wright’s recounting of Marx’s errors falls 
exactly into the same pattern. And in his ‘alternative formulation’75 he 
proposes a theory, not of dynamic trajectory, as in the case of Marx, but of 
‘structural possibility’,76 which implies that we cannot predict what will happen, 
as Marxism sought to do, but instead can shed light on what might happen. It 
would be useful to have a road map to the future. But : 
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Alas, there is no map, and no existing social theory is sufficiently powerful to 
even begin to construct such a comprehensive representation of possible 
social destinations, possible futures.77 
If there isn’t a roadmap to the future, Wright suggests instead that we 
consider explanations of the future as a ‘voyage of exploration’.78 In order to 
direct us forward, Wright exhorts us to use a ‘socialist compass’ which will 
provide the necessary principles on which to navigate our thrustings into the 
future.79 The question, then, is what this socialist compass might entail. 
Wright begins his next chapter by clarifying some concepts – power ; 
ownership ; and the state, economy and civil society. Power is the capacity to 
realize one’s interests.80 Ownership is multidimensional, comprising the 
agents of ownership, the objects of ownership, and the rights of ownership.81 
In simple terms, Wright wants to argue that ownership generally means : 
… the right to transfer property and the right over the surplus, and the terms 
“power” and “control” … describe the effective capacity to direct the use of 
the means of production.82 
Wright also attempts a definition of the state as ‘the cluster of institutions, 
more or less coherently organized, which imposes binding rules and 
regulations over a territory’.83 State power then becomes the capacity to 
enforce rules and regulations in this territory. The economy is defined as the 
realm of goods and services, and civil society as the universe of voluntary 
association. It therefore follows that capitalism is that system in which the 
means of production are privately owned, statism the same system, this time 
in the state’s hands, and socialism thus becomes an economic structure in 
which the means of production are socially owned and directed through what 
Wright calls ‘social power’ – the power that arises from the ‘capacity to 
mobilize people’ voluntarily in civil society.84 The future of socialist society, 
in Wright’s eyes, will always be connected to working-class power, but it will 
also include important non-class elements.85 Wright thus opens the door to a 
world in which feminism, anti-racist movements and the politics of sexual 
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identity should be fully recognized within the ambit of socialism.  
 
All societies are hybrids, he reminds us, having within them the elements of 
capitalism, socialism, statism, the gift economy, bartering, the household 
economy, and a variety of other forms of economic life.86 This suggests 
possibilities, because it proposes a view of the future in which no system 
entirely dominates. Thus it might reasonably be said on empirical grounds 
that elements of cooperative economic life sustain themselves even in the 
most capitalist societies, and that dictatorships, however repressive, always 
fail to bring about the ‘pure’ society that they planned to bring into being. 
Then Wright brings us to the three main elements of the ‘socialist compass’. 
It comprises : 
 
1. Social empowerment over the way state power affects economic activity. 
2.  Social empowerment over the way economic power shapes economic 
activity. 
3.  Social empowerment directly over economic activity.87 
 
These ‘three directions of social empowerment’88 lead to a variety of linkages 
that he is then at pains to set out in detail. He compares the new model to 
statist socialism, where power remains with the state, and with social 
democratic statism, the neoliberal model in which the state is still profoundly 
implicated, but neither model, of course, enables social empowerment to 
come into being. He also canvasses some more fruitful alternatives, including 
‘Associational Democracy’, a form of corporatist coalition in which the state, 
civil society and the private sector collaborate in the management of the 
economy, which, in Wright’s view, may offer a path to social 
empowerment,89 and ‘Social Capitalism’, a system in which, for example, 
trade unions can come to manage large elements of the economy through 
enforced shareholding in large companies, as in the case of a proposed 
Swedish plan that he outlines. Wright also describes three further forms of 
economy and society90 – the cooperative market economy, in which he lays out the 
implications of cooperatives, in which workers collectively own the business, 
working together to form ‘large associations’, and thus enhancing the power 
of the movement ; the social economy, by which he understands elements in the 
economy not driven by the market or the state. This includes the activities of 
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non-profit organizations, and operations such as Wikipedia. Finally Wright 
explains participatory socialism which appears to offer the most direct pathway 
to the promised land of social empowerment : 
… the state and civil society jointly organize and control various kinds of 
production of goods and services. In participatory socialism the role of the 
state is more persuasive and direct than in the social economy. The state does 
not simply provide funding and set the parameters ; it is also, in various ways, 
directly involved in the organization and production of the economic activity. 
On the other hand, participatory socialism is also different from statist 
socialism, for here social power plays a role not simply through the ordinary 
channels of democratic control of state policies, but directly inside the 
productive activities themselves.91 
For Wright, the state still plays a significant role in this post-capitalist society, 
if that is what it is.92 A true freedom among the associations of civil society 
would give rise to horrors, as well as to emancipatory opportunities, and thus, 
in Wright’s view, the state must chaperone the way forward. If this is a 
society in which capitalism has dissolved, or, at least, now plays a subordinate 
role, this does not mean the state has dissolved as well. Indeed, the state must 
remain involved to keep the trains running on time. None of this guarantees 
a more egalitarian future, but it does establish the terrain on which such a 
possibility is more likely. 
 
In ‘Real Utopias’,93 Wright tries to show in concrete ways precisely what 
mechanisms will most likely bring about the changes he wants to see. These 
strategies will need to meet three criteria – they must meet the egalitarian 
emancipatory ideals set out above ; they must be viable ; they must provide a 
pathway to social empowerment.94 If we ask the question - is there a role for 
the state in the future of progressive societies, Wright’s answer is a 
resounding yes in most instances. Wright then rehearses a variety of forms of 
democracy – direct democracy, in which citizens vote directly on laws and 
policies ; representative democracies, typical of advanced western societies ; 
and associational democracies, in which collective organization, such as 
unions or business associations, are engaged in the decision-making.95 The 
question then arises as to which kinds of institutions allow this best form of 
democracy to occur. The Porto Alegre budgeting example is disinterred here, 
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and several conclusions drawn.96 Such mechanisms are empowered from the 
bottom up, they are pragmatic, and they are based on serious deliberations. 
The decision-making must really be devolved, and decisions must be brought 
to the centre again once made. Thus there is a major role for government and 
the state here. Finally such mechanisms require the formation of a counter-
vailing power to resist the orthodox sources of authority. The strategy 
requires ‘popular mobilization.’97 
 
Wright then reviews three democratic initiatives. Bruce Ackerman’s proposal98 
relates specifically to the United States. It proposes that at the beginning of 
each year, each citizen is given a card on which $50 is placed to be spent 
uniquely on electoral campaigns. If candidates accept such funds, they cannot 
accept funds from the traditional major donors. They will do so because 
there is much more money to be had from the cards. And such a strategy will 
itself become a weapon in political campaigns, since candidates taking the 
card will be able to declare themselves champions of democracy, whereas 
others will be clearly under the sway of vested interests. It would be a form 
of public financing that allows a much wider influence on the political system 
to come into being.  
 
In a second proposal Wright considers the strategy of ‘random selection 
citizens’ assemblies’, following the way juries are picked, and how the 
legislative bodies were chosen in Athens in the early years of democracy.99 
Would such a strategy work today – would it provide a viable mechanism 
towards social empowerment? The advantages are, to some extent, obvious. 
Such a polity would engage citizens directly, thus providing the possibility 
that the interests of ordinary citizens would be better represented than in 
traditional systems. We could see if those chosen accurately represent the 
population. Since the present polity is profoundly male-dominated, for 
example, it should be readily apparent that this change would alter the 
balance of representation. And if a process of serious deliberation were to 
occur, then the interests of the community should be more accurately 
represented than in alternative systems. Fishkin, Ackerman’s co-author in the 
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writing of Deliberation Day,100 has conducted a series of experiments to test 
this proposal. In one, he gathers people together over a weekend to discuss 
an issue of general interest. Balanced information on the issue is distributed 
to the participants, then debate ensues which is televised and recorded. 
Changes in opinions are then recorded, the purpose being to show that such 
an ‘ordinary’ assembly is fully capable of assimilating information, debating 
issues, completing a process of deliberation, and making informed choices.101  
 
Then, in what appears to be, at first glance, a third proposal, Wright opens up 
the question of ‘associational democracy’. Since he has already dismissed this 
strategy as the least democratic to hand, this is perhaps surprising. But, he 
argues Cohen and Rogers have shown that associations can play a positive 
role of progressive politics.102 They do this in four ways : by pooling 
resources from otherwise disadvantaged groups ; by assisting with citizen 
education ; by providing information to decision-makers ; and by helping 
with the problem of collective problem-solving. Deep democracy allows 
people control over their lives. In Wright’s interpretation, this strategy aids in 
developing such a condition. And associational democracy also offers an 
alternative to the market-driven solutions that are often proposed. This is a 
form of corporatism which many feel has outlived its usefulness as a strategy. 
Instead Cohen and Rogers argue more could be done with such a régime. An 
example from Quebec is cited as a way this might occur profitably. Further 
examples, one from Wisconsin concerning the issue of regional labour 
markets, another relating to habitat conservation, are also brought into play 
to bolster the argument. 
 
Each of these three forms of democracy offers a way forward, in Wright’s 
eyes, towards a more deeply democratic society. What is needed, Wright 
concludes, is a ‘deepening’ of all three forms of democracy. In his last section 
on ‘real utopias’,103 Wright focuses on economic systems, and specifically the 
social power that controls economies. Rather than adopting the state-centred 
approach of the socialist past, Wright now wants to suggest a multiplicity of 
pathways exist that lead towards social empowerment. This is ‘market 
socialism’ in one form of another, so the taint of Blairism is about – the 
market cannot be avoided and must be included in all our plans. Wright 
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immediately understands this, but he argues : 
Few theorists today hold on to the belief that a complex, large-scale economy 
could be viable without some role for markets – understood as a system of 
decentralized, voluntary exchanges that are responsive to supply and demand 
– in economic coordination.104 
The question Wright is keen to answer is how, given that the market is 
inevitable, the social power of the broader society might be brought to bear 
on market relations. The possibility of socialism lies here – not in the 
ownership of the means of production, but instead in social empowerment. 
Thus the ‘social economy’ is the economy organized and controlled by social 
power.105 Wright cites Wikipedia and the Quebec social economy as 
examples of the new social forms. In Wikipedia, Wright sees an organization 
that is thoroughly anti-capitalist and egalitarian, with direct and open 
interaction among participants. It is managed by a democratic system of 
governance and regulation, and thus conforms in many ways to Wright’s 
notion of radical democratic egalitarianism.106 In the Quebec social economy, 
Wright finds state subsidies targeted towards the social economy,107 the 
emergence of social economy development funds governance through 
associational democracy, and a participatory form of organization.  
 
Wright then turns his attention to the question of the unconditional basic 
income question, a proposal that had recently been raised in European 
circles.108 The value of the proposal lies in several progressive qualities that it 
embodies – it separates workers from the wage relation of capitalism ; it 
creates more equality in labour markets ; it solves the problem of poverty ; 
and it provides a way of valorising the various care-giving activities that are 
devalued by markets. It could increase the power of organized labour, and it 
could clearly provide substantial support for the non-capitalist economy, thus 
encouraging social empowerment. Wright then rehearses a series of 
approaches that he groups under the heading ‘social capitalism’. These refer 
to organizations that impinge on the power of capital, of which trade unions 
are the most obvious example. The discussion leads to the question of 
whether unions, or associations like them, could orchestrate their efforts 
towards ownership of substantial part of the capitalist economy, such as had 
been proposed in Sweden in the 1970s. In Quebec, a solidarity fund has been 
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established to support small and medium businesses, which is a similar 
initiative on a smaller scale.109 The strategy has many elements of social 
empowerment that are attractive, including labour movement involvement, a 
social audit of possible companies in which investment might take place, a 
large number of working class investors through unions, and a long-term 
horizon, rather than an obsession with short-term profitability, the so-called 
‘patient capital’ strategy.110 In addition, there was government support.  
 
The history of cooperative ownership is next canvassed. Worker-owned 
firms have a long history. According to Wright, Marx called such strategies 
‘utopian socialism’, though he was later to soften his stance towards the 
movement.111 The Mondragón experiment is cited as an iconic example of a 
recent such process at work, though in most cases, these undertakings 
comprise a small part of the national economy. But again, many of the 
features of the social empowerment strategy that Wright has been 
propagating are represented here. 
 
Having concentrated thus far on what Wright calls ‘partial aspects’ of social 
empowerment, Wright now turns his attention to theories of social 
transformation, and he begins with John Roemer’s market socialism.112 
Roemer identifies socialism as equal ownership of the means of production 
by all citizens.113 Thus, instead of social power, as in Wright’s formulation, 
this future is imagined in terms of social ownership. And instead of the state 
being involved, Roemer imagines the use of a stock market and decentralised 
control to make this arrangement work. All adults are given coupons to be 
used in the market, and when they die, the coupons revert to the common 
pool.114 The income generated by dividends can be used as cash in the 
consumer market. However, the state also plays a role in regulating this 
market and ensuring the rules are followed. Why is this model important? 
Wright argues it has two benefits – it greatly reduces the inequalities present 
now in the market, and it also makes markets more democratic in allowing 
widespread social ownership of private companies in a variety of ways. But 
precisely how this might occur, and what mechanisms might be needed is 
radically unclear, and the possibilities for the system ever to come into being 
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also seem remote.  
 
Wright also examines a more revolutionary proposal set out by Michael 
Albert. Albert calls his proposal ‘Participatory Economics’ (Parecon)115. 
Albert replaces Roemer’s coupons with a more dramatic scenario. Imagine 
that all workplaces were owned by all citizens. No coupons or intermediaries 
would be needed. Second, he proposes that rather than a one-person, one-
vote system that only works well in special circumstances, instead people 
should have power over the issues that affect them, complete power over 
personal decisions, shared power over decisions that affect them and others. 
And instead of jobs, Albert suggest the creation of what he calls ‘job 
complexes’. Thus each person would spend the day doing some very 
interesting things and some mundane, but necessary things. An example 
helps to clarify his proposal here : 
… a brain surgeon would thus spend part of each day changing bed pans or 
doing other menial, tedious work in a hospital.116 
Work would be rewarded according to two criteria – effort and sacrifice on 
the one hand, and need on the other. Participatory planning will manage the 
whole operation – workers and consumers’ councils will direct activities at 
every level of production. People make proposals and come forward with 
plans. Plans are then either accepted or rejected at higher levels of authority. 
Plans go back and forward and annual plans are finally produced. Clearly this 
is a direct pathway to a social economy. And indeed, this is a plan that goes, 
not just beyond the market, but beyond the state. This is a radical outline of a 
world of social empowerment. But Wright is skeptical about the possibilities 
of such a system ever coming into operation on a grand scale.117 For Albert, 
though, the main problem is capitalism, and no version of market socialism, 
such as Roemer’s, will do. Wright cannot go with him to a position beyond 
markets, however.118 It is important to quote Wright directly here because he 
comes back to regulationism as a mechanism for going forward : 
I do not … think there are good grounds for this absolutist rejection of 
markets. Even if they are corrosive of egalitarian and democratic values it 
does not follow that it is impossible to impose upon markets forms of social 
and political regulation that would largely neutralize these corrosive effects 
… Once we drop the assumption that markets are like cancer – so that if you 
have a little in the mix then it will inevitably corrode and destroy social 
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empowerment – then the issue of the optimal balance between participatory 
planning and unplanned market allocations is not one that can be decided in 
advance … 119 
Wright then advocates four reasons why there should still be markets in the 
utopia of the future – first, because a little anarchy might be useful for 
citizens beyond the planning process120 ; second, markets might provide a 
good way for experimenting with risk-taking beyond the planning process ; 
third, the Parecon planning process might get overwhelmed121 ; and, finally, 
do people want to spend their lives planning and meeting? If not, then the 
market economy may flood back into operation.122 
 
Wright has no plausible reason for arguing for market efficiency to take up 
the slack when Albert’s planning falls apart, or is deficient in some way. And 
what is most interesting in Albert’s account is the lack of a state structure. 
There is, one might say a ‘Grey State’, a state that isn’t a state, but rather a 
national structure of participatory councils or workers’ coalitions that act like 
a central authority, work like a central authority, look like a central authority, 
and clearly have a power to decide fundamental issues of policy and practice, 
but which aren’t called a state. The great difference between existing states 
and this ‘grey state’, Albert would doubtless argue, is that this form of 
organization is in constant dialogue with the citizens which it seeks to help 
and manage. The participatory element of the dialogue is certainly different, 
progressive, and potentially utopian. 
 
Wright concludes with a series of further examples of signposts towards 
social empowerment.123 They include community land trusts, international 
labour standards campaigns, university student campaigns against sweatshops, 
forestry conservation movements, and equal exchange and fair trade. He 
doesn’t draw his own conclusions here, but instead moves forward to an 
exposition of a theory of transformation towards social empowerment in his 
next chapter, which, together with the rest of the book, constitutes an 
extended conclusion on his previous musings.124 
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In ‘Elements of a Theory of Transformation’,125 Wright begins with the 
problem of resistance to radical transformation. In his view, the problem can 
be thought to comprise four problems. The problem of social reproduction 
refers to the maintenance of social structures and institutions.126 Any account 
of social transformation must account for the way in which existing systems 
are obdurate and resist change. Wright outlines the way in which social 
reproduction can take on both an active and passive form, passive in the 
sense that people just go along with things – with work, with family, with 
inequality – and active reproduction, which results from the actions of 
institutions to preserve the existing social order.  For Wright, oppression 
results from the active involvement of these institutions.127 This reproduction 
results from coercion, rules, ideology and material interests.128 Coercion 
results from regulation and threats of regulation or sanctions. Rules refer to 
the ‘rules of the game’. This is best exemplified by the dilemma of socialist 
parties. Involvement in the electoral process required following the rules of 
the game, but to do so limited militancy and the chance to bring about radical 
change. Thus following the rules implies a lack of possibilities. In terms of 
ideology and culture, the fundamental role of the mass media is in the 
limelight, as well as the institutions of socialization, such as the schools and 
the family. Finally, material interests, the business of work in a capitalist 
society, is rehearsed as the fourth dimension of social reproduction. The 
commonly-held view, that capitalism is good for everyone, has a grain of 
truth in it. When economic crisis arises, such views come into question. Thus 
social reproduction here depends on the degree to which the population is 
integrated and supported by the economic system. 
 
Wright now turns to a consideration of forms of reproduction, contrasting 
‘despotic reproduction’ with ‘hegemonic reproduction’.129 Under despotism, 
coercion prevails, but under hegemony, consent is the dominant form of 
control. The state is more complex under conditions of hegemony than in 
conditions of coercion. But these systems of reproduction are always 
incomplete. Complexity leads to problems in itself. Wright comments : 
For a whole host of familiar reasons, capitalism would destroy itself in the 
absence of an effective state capable of regulating various aspects of the 
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market and production … in order for these interventions to work well the 
state needs to have both a degree of autonomy and an effective capacity to 
act … In the absence of this autonomy, parts of the state can be captured by 
particular groups of capitalists … (but) This autonomy and capacity … also 
mean that the state will have the ability to damage capital accumulation as 
well as facilitate it. This creates the spectre of the state undermining social 
reproduction … 130 
Thus, given the complexity of the social system, the state is sometimes 
unable to guarantee social reproduction, at least in a complete sense. In 
addition, problems arise when plans are carried out to solve problems, and 
they are based on inadequate knowledge, they result from struggles between 
various groups and not from good design, and there are unintended 
consequences. A third problem results from the rigidities of the system.131 
Finally, the social structure always has unanticipated issues and this results in 
unpredictability. 
 
History, for Wright, and social changes in history, result from two sources – 
unintended outcomes of peoples’ action, and conscious attempts directed 
towards social change. But to bring this change about requires a theory of 
change with a long time horizon.132 Theories of the future tend to fall into 
two camps – theories of rupture and theories of metamorphosis. 
Revolutionary Marxism is a theory of rupture. Theories of metamorphosis 
can be interstitial – build institutions in the cracks and crevices of the existing 
capitalist institutions – or symbiotic – strategies that seek to extend and 
deepen existing institutions. Ruptural strategies tend to depend on classes 
organized through political parties.133 Social movements focus on interstitial 
strategies. Here different collective actors, well beyond class, may be 
involved. Symbiotic strategies tend to involve coalitions, and often the labour 
movement. Ruptural strategies involve direct attacks on the state, interstitial 
strategies occur outside the state, and symbiotic strategies use the state.134 
Each of these three strategies is then rehearsed in more detail in the three 
following chapters. In his conclusion, Wright argues that capitalism is now 
(2010) again in a situation of crisis. Capitalist triumphalism has disappeared, 
and uncertainty has taken its place. But some key lessons can be drawn from 
this history and from his analysis, he argues. Wright points to the obdurate 
nature of capital’s resistance to social and political justice, to its hybridity and 
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to the alternatives. Socialism, in this view, is also a hybrid. The fundamental 
idea that Wright is pushing is social empowerment over the economy. 
Without changing the nature of economic control, then no further progress 
can be made. He sees multiple pathways forward, and thus socialism for him 
is a hybrid set of ideas, rather than a simple formula, but nonetheless a set of 
ideas with social empowerment at the centre of them. And if the future is 
socialist, it is clearly not a guaranteed future, but merely a terrain in which the 
struggle will take place. There is, in this view, no one way forward, and we are 
left instead with strategic indeterminacy. 
 
In a later book with Robin Hahnel, Wright makes another attempt to 
propose an alternative future.135 Here Wright again proposes a ‘real utopian 
socialism’.136 The introduction points to the exhaustion of ideas on the left in 
the face of a continuingly successful and all-embracing capitalism, and the 
lack of any plausible ideas or visions. Into this space, the present volume 
appears as a much-needed alternative. Wright’s contribution reproduces the 
arguments first set out in Real Utopias. But in this setting he is in dialogue 
with Robin Hahnel, and with the ideas set out under Michael Albert’s 
‘Parecon’ proposal in the earlier book137 Wright had been dismissive of this 
strategy before, even while he agreed with many of the elements of Albert’s 
arguments. Here he finds many other sources of agreement. Among the 
sources of agreement are a strong commitment to egalitarianism,138 justice in 
the workplace, radical democracy, and their common critique of capitalism.  
But he disagrees that large-scale, and perhaps global, participatory planning 
could ever hope to bring about transformation. He cannot believe that this 
future will remove markets from the scene. Instead, Wright reiterates his 
previous argument – that the future is likely to consist of hybridity – various 
forms of social institutions that support social empowerment - and that 
markets will be a part of this future.139 He imagines a variety of markets, 
some of which are more acceptable than others, some of which are regulated, 
and some of which are not.140 He then engages in a detailed dialogue with 
Hahnel’s arguments. Among the many criticisms that Wright brings up is the 
issue of the state, which had seemed to me implicit in the earlier ‘Parecon’ 
account but never fully expressed : 
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There is one set of issues around public goods planning in Robin’s model 
that was not clear to me: the role of Government institutions rather than just 
consumer federations. On one interpretation of Robin’s participatory 
economics model, virtually all government functions are replaced by 
consumer councils and federations and by workers councils and federations. 
There might still be a role for government around certain kinds of rule-
making and rule enforcing – for example, things like speed limits or 
enforcing the accurate reporting of pollution discharges so the planning 
process (however it is organized) has accurate information on which to deal 
with externalities. But the government would have no responsibility for 
planning and producing any kind of public goods.141  
It is clear enough that in the ‘Parecon’ model, some form of state is 
powerfully at work. I called this a ‘grey state’ in an earlier formulation. 
Whatever one calls it, this elaborate hierarchy of planning mechanism 
culminates in some high-level decision-making body that, with its 
subordinate elements, carries out decisions, employs a staff, deploys 
resources, and wields power. In short, it carries out all the activities of what, 
in other contexts, would be called a state. If it has four legs, a tail, and it 
meows, one might as well call it a cat, one might reasonably argue. 
 
In his ‘Socialism and Real Utopias’,142 Wright reiterates his argument from his 
previous work, but he puts the case somewhat differently here. In this 
exposition, he emphasises that the social in socialism is not just state control 
but control by society at large. Thus ‘socially owned’ means that economic 
resources are owned by all citizens.143 Then follows a series of diagrams that 
specify the differences between capitalism, statism and social ownership. 
Clearly, Wright is moving beyond statism, into which category Wright places 
much of the theorizing of the 1960s and 1970s. He implies, without precisely 
saying so, that those theories, whether focused on the smashing of the state 
or its gradual reformulation, nonetheless depended on the state for the 
evolution of a new society.144 He then reviews seven alternatives to existing 
capitalist arrangements, many of which we have met before. They include 
social capitalism, statist socialism, social democratic statism, associational 
democracy, the cooperative market economy, the solidarity economy and 
participatory socialism.  
 
At the end of this discussion of political alternatives, Wright turn to consider 
markets – do they still have a place in the future he is proposing? Clearly the 
                                                     
141 Ibid., page 23. 
142 Ibid., page 60ff. 
143 See footnote 41, page 62. 
144 See footnote 42, page 72. 
Chapter Six 
 
30 
strategies he is outlining allow a place for markets, regulated to one degree or 
another :  
I do not see market transactions as such as intrinsically undesirable. What is 
undesirable (are) the ways in which markets can enable people and 
organizations with specific kinds of power to gain advantages over others, 
and second, the way markets, if inadequately regulated, generate all sorts of 
destructive … harms on people. But if those problems are minimised 
through various mechanisms, then the sheer fact of buyers and sellers of 
goods and services agreeing to exchange things at a mutually agreed-upon 
price is not, in and of itself, objectionable.145 
This is clearly a point of separation between Hahnel and Wright because 
Hahnel sees no place for markets. In complex societies, Wright suggests that 
markets may provide the only solution to what he calls a ‘design problem’.146 
They allow things to occur that cannot be organized in another way. Getting 
to a socialist future means bringing to bear various elements of the seven 
strategies he has already outlined. Thus a hybrid socialism is what he 
imagines, with social power at the centre of the new forms of organization. 
While the new system may still contain elements of the market and 
capitalism, it is Wright’s belief that socialist ways of doing things will come to 
predominate. He reminds us of his three kinds of transformation – ruptural, 
interstitial and symbiotic – strategies that he has introduced in his earlier 
work. 
 
In his brief conclusion, he restates his commitment to social empowerment 
as the pathway forward. Some of this movement will involve the state, and 
some will not. In his last section147 Wright tries to say, as clearly as possible, 
what remains of the differences between his approach and those of Hahnel. 
Obviously, Wright finds a place for markets in his future and Hahnel does 
not. In the end, while Hahnel sees markets as cancer-forming, damaging the 
structure of society and all those involved with them, Wright prefers the 
metaphor of ‘carcinogenic agent’. In other words, in the Wright view, 
markets have a propensity towards harm, but this propensity can be managed 
with proper treatment.148 Wright continues to insist that markets can solve 
some problems that cannot be solved easily in other ways - ‘convenience’ is 
the term he uses to define this problem.149 Markets also allow risk-taking and 
the necessary trade-offs required for democracy to work effectively. In his 
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hybrid society, he has room for the possibility of what he calls ‘marketish 
processes’150 since, unlike Hahnel, he does not believe that the future can be 
entirely and unambiguously predicted. And Wright does not believe that 
Hahnel’s reliance on mathematical modelling is valuable. Finally, Wright 
disputes the need for a final ‘rupture’ with the system, believing that such an 
approach may not be useful in developing an emancipatory alternative. Thus, 
Wright concludes, a variety of pathways forward is our best chance of 
moving towards social emancipation and social empowerment. But a rupture 
within the present society is long into the future : 
I suspect that the time horizon before the issue of attempting a systemic 
rupture with capitalism in developed capitalist countries is very far in the 
future, and that it is even further in the future before the issue of whether or 
not markets should be abolished will be on the political agenda of any 
democratic society. But I also doubt that one’s beliefs now about what 
should be decided under those future conditions would greatly affect any 
choices about strategies and initiatives today. It is in this sense that I think 
the main thing is to be very clear about fundamental values and the critique 
of capitalism, about the possibility of realizing those values to a much greater 
extent in alternative economic institutions, and about the practical initiatives 
we can undertake today that move us in that direction.151 
Wright wants to offer some hope that, if indeed, major transformations are 
well over the horizon, then there is much to be done in the meantime to 
ameliorate our present dilemmas. Wright’s hybridity and his acceptance of 
markets under proper control enables us to see a series of ways in which, 
given the present circumstances, progress can be made. Indeed, with his use 
of a variety of examples, he is able to show that many elements of the society 
he hopes for already exist, even if they exist in disparate contexts, scattered 
throughout the world. None the less, these examples serve the purpose of 
taking the utopian visions into the ‘actually existing world’, and thus offer a 
counter-argument to the most obvious critics of utopian thinking, who 
dismissively call such work unrealistic and empty. 
 
Wright does sustain a role for the state, but this time as an enabling system 
which will allow social ownership, rather than as an anchor for all the 
socialist hopes for the future. This theory of the state is partial and 
incomplete, and cannot compare to the extraordinarily rich accounts offered 
by the theorists of the 1970s and 1980s, who he now assign to the slagheap 
of history. This is because he resolutely rejects state socialism, or any version 
of it, as the centerpiece of the new society. On the other hand, he reserves, 
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and stoutly defends, the role of markets in this new world of his, and, along 
with his wide variety of new elements, sees, instead of a simple map to 
socialism, a more complex, partial, somewhat less hopeful, and more 
ambiguous, future. This is the socialism of Post-Fordism, rather than the 
Fordist socialism of the past. There is no longer one future to be dreamed of, 
if there ever was. Instead of certainty, Wright offers ambiguity.  
 
Perhaps Wright’s account of markets constitutes a form of fatalism. Markets 
are ubiquitous, and they seem to function well, even if they are implicitly 
unequal and unjust. But it does not seem so. Wright seems convinced that 
markets are useful in a more positive sense and not just mechanisms to be 
avoided. I would argue that instead of using the logic of the market, one 
could speak of the same thing in different ways, using, for example, the 
language of exchange. Exchanges are inevitable and often useful. They may 
take the form of gift exchanges, or exchanges between people in a garage 
sale, where both are happy with the price, or exchanges on Craig’s list or E-
bay, where people set a price and seek a seller. Exchanges of this kind, and 
many others that take place in their millions each day, are valuable, tolerably 
democratic and usually equal. They are also immensely useful, as Wright 
requires of his market mechanisms. Why not use this language, rather than 
the language of the market, which is redolent with a long history of 
corruption, inequality, exploitation and injustice? The problem with Wright’s 
use of the language of the market is that he cannot escape the semiology that 
surrounds the use of the term. 
 
The state, then, in Wright’s final account, is a bit player in the socialist future 
he anticipates. There is much to admire in Wright’s account. The optimism, 
the careful analytic work, the willingness to struggle at length and with great 
effort on the most intractable problems facing society at large, and 
progressive people in particular, are all valuable contributions to the political 
work of the future. The state, long imagined to be the central actor in all this, 
now comes to play a minor role, drawn onto the stage in a bit part as a spear-
holder when necessary, but removed from the commanding roles of director 
and producer in whatever form of society we can muster up in the future. 
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3. Bourdieu : ‘We are the State’152 
Biography 
Pierre Bourdieu’s biography at first glance takes on the shape of a predictable 
cliché. Born in 1930 in a small, rural village in the Pyrénées in southwest 
France to a father who was a sharecropper, and later the postman, he was 
sent to Paris early on to study at the prestigious École normale supérieure.153 
This much is part of the rags-to-riches, poor-boy-made-good, story of 
coming-of-age novels everywhere. He went on to become, by several 
measures, the most influential social scientist of the 20th century, the most 
highly cited, and the most revolutionary thinker, both in empirical sociology, 
but also in the related fields of the theory, philosophy and the epistemology 
of the social. He shifted the way sociology did its work for many people. But 
while the superficial recounting of his biography suggests it was well planned, 
a more careful reading will show that Bourdieu’s life was anything but 
straightforward. Richard Nice154 comments : 
I think there are two versions of Bourdieu’s past. One is the mythical one in 
which he is the peasant boy confronting urban civilization, and the other one, 
which he actually thought through more seriously is what it’s like to be a petit 
bourgeois and a success story. And all this obsession with other people’s 
language, and with the use of language to dominate and put down in rational 
and non-rational ways is perhaps the rethinking of his own experience.155 
Bourdieu was conscripted to fight in the Algerian War, an experience that 
profoundly shaped his early work, and his own social understandings. He 
soon returned to France, and continued his political and intellectual life at full 
speed. He returned under the patronage of Raymond Aron, who initially 
appointed him a teaching assistant at the Sorbonne. In 1964 he became the 
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co-director, with Aron, of a new research unit, the ‘Center for Historical 
Sociology’,156 as well as a director of studies at the École des haute études en 
science sociales. His sponsors included three academic and institutional 
heavyweights – Aron himself, as well as Claude Lévi-Strauss and Ferdinand 
Braudel. 
 
Bourdieu initially busied himself on a series of tasks that were immediately to 
separate him from Aron’s vividly liberal position. With his insistence on the 
primacy of social class as a source of social explanation, he established a 
political difference with his mentor that could not easily be bridged. Like 
many of this era, he became vigorously engaged in a debate with Marx, but 
not through the usual channels of Marxist existentialism, or through 
membership of the Socialist or Communist parties, around which many 
intellectuals focused their attention.157 From the start, Bourdieu sought to 
employ what he termed ‘rigorous scientific work’ to the service of political 
life, eschewing the brilliant, but what Bourdieu considered, the deeply 
superficial work of writers such as Roland Barthes, work he described as 
mere essayism, fashionable, certainly, insightful perhaps, but in the end 
lacking rigour or any lasting value. Bourdieu was always engaged in several 
projects at once, but perhaps most significant at this point were his twin 
activities in art and education – both were deeply infused with the flavour of 
social class. In The Love of Art and in Photography,158 written during the mid-
sixties, Bourdieu and his colleagues were able to show how social 
classifications, economic difference and cultural knowledge permeate, diffuse 
and come to characterise both the production and the consumption of art. At 
the same time, Bourdieu was undertaking his seminal work on education that 
was to extend his reputation far beyond French borders. In 1964 Bourdieu 
and Passeron published The Inheritors159 which : 
… advanced stinging criticism of the class-based character of the French 
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university population and of student culture.160 
This ‘removal of the veil’ previously concealing the class origins of the 
gloriously republican and putatively egalitarian French educational system 
was revelatory and revolutionary. It was also, clearly enough, profoundly 
political.161 But it was the May 1968 events that were further to sharpen the 
political differences between Bourdieu and others. Like most French 
intellectuals, he didn’t foresee the rise of the students resistance movement, 
but unlike many of them, he was at odds with it. Not until much later did 
Bourdieu fully express himself on this issue : 
Bourdieu’s early silence regarding the events of May 1968 is conspicuous, for 
the French student movement received special attention from all the other 
leading French sociologists of the time. Only when secure in the highest and 
most prestigious academic position in French academe at the Collège de 
France did Bourdieu publish, in Homo Academicus, his interpretation of May 
1968 … Bourdieu remain(ed) skeptical of the real significance of the French 
May 1968 experience … he describe(d) it as only a “symbolic revolution” or 
“collective trauma” that, while contributing to the re-emergence of cultural 
conservatism in the academy, has been “without political consequences” or 
any genuine transformation.162 
Taking the State Seriously 
Bourdieu had been writing politically from the moment he brought pen to 
paper in the 1950s, but during this later period, Bourdieu had been writing 
ever more seriously in a political direction – the emphasis on social class saw 
to that – but he had not directly and in detail examined the role of the state in 
one concentrated place, though he made many references to it over many 
years.163 In any event, he rectified this situation completely in 1989 when he 
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embarked on three years of lectures on the topic between 1989 and 1992.164 
The 1989 introduction presents a typical example of Bourdieu’s 
extraordinarily convoluted and, simultaneously, brilliantly incisive writing. He 
requires us to think again about the state because the state has already told us 
how to think about it : 
… the further I advance in my work on the state, the more convinced I am 
that, if we have a particular difficulty in thinking this object, it is because it is 
– and I weigh my words – almost unthinkable. If it is so easy to say easy 
things about this object, that is precisely because we are in a certain sense 
penetrated by the very thing we have to study.165 
And in another typical Bourdieu phrase in the very first paragraph, equally 
designed to cause confusion, he comments that ‘agents (of the state) have an 
interest in disinterestedness’.166 That is, the agents of the state have a social 
role to represent the nation, society at large, the national interest, while 
simultaneously concealing their own interest in power, status or whatever else 
might be operating. Thus, in a characteristic move towards reflexivity, 
Bourdieu begins his account by requiring the audience to think of the state 
anew.  
 
Bourdieu then reviews existing state theory – theories of the state as a neutral 
site, theories from the Marxist tradition, from Marx, to Gramsci, to Althusser 
and beyond, to which he is opposed. No-one who reads Bourdieu carefully 
can imagine he is not in close and routine dialogue with Marx, but this is no 
easy discipleship – the orthodoxy of the socialist and communist literature is 
nowhere to be found. Indeed, Bourdieu sees an orthodoxy in neo-Marxist 
scholarship he seeks to avoid. In his view, theories that suggest dominance of 
the ruling class, as well as the serving of the interests of agents of the state 
themselves, can be called functionalist, and the Althusserians and the 
Parsonians tell us nothing when they tell us what the state can do.167 Instead, 
the state for Bourdieu is a ‘well-founded illusion’, closer to a religious belief 
than a mere instrument of bureaucracy. Bourdieu then shows his hand more 
clearly by setting out his argument to come : 
I would say that the state is the name that we give to the hidden, invisible 
principles ... of the social order, and at the same time, of both physical and 
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symbolic domination, likewise of physical and symbolic violence.168 
The fact that we have a public time, a time when we get up for work, and a 
time when we go to bed, more or less agreed upon, and acted upon in large 
numbers, assumes we have swallowed this ordering of the world into our 
bodies, into our mental structures : 
People are quantified and coded by the state : they have a state identity. The 
functions of the state clearly include the production of legitimate social 
identity ; in other words, even if we do not agree with these identities, we 
have to put up with them ... The state is this well-founded illusion, this place 
that exists because people believe it exists … By the way of preamble, 
therefore, what I want to say is : be careful, all sentences that have the state 
as subject are theological sentences – which does not mean they are false, 
inasmuch as the state is a theological entity, that is, an entity that exists by 
way of belief.169 
This assertion of the state as a theological, a religious entity, turns on its head 
much of what has been written about the state to this point. It places the 
state in our mental structures, first and foremost, a view that few had taken 
seriously. As school inspectors inspect schools they embody the idea of the 
state. The state makes statements ; the inspector judges and pronounces. 
Teachers, working for the state, judge students, provide insults and 
encouragement in equal measure. When teachers say these things in a state 
school, it has the force of the state behind it. It is the judgement of the social 
writ large. It is the authorized account.170 These forms of acts are expressions 
of symbolic authority. Thus, we must think of the state in a new way : 
The state … is not a bloc, it is a field. The administrative field, as a particular 
site in the field of power, is a field, that is, a space structured according to 
oppositions linked to specific forms of capital with different interests.171 
Bourdieu has now introduced his field theory, which implies that we already 
know something about his central notions of capital, habitus, sites of 
struggle, strategy and social classes. It is sufficient to know, for the moment, 
that Bourdieu is proposing the state as a social space in which interests 
compete for various valued goods, (capitals) and in which strategy and 
struggle play a part. In his next lecture,172 Bourdieu comments on what he 
takes to be the parlous condition of state theory : 
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I think that if the theory of the state, in the ramshackle state it is in today – at 
least to my mind – can keep going, this is because it floats in a world that is 
independent from reality. Theorists can discuss ad infinitum, whether they 
are from Marxist or neo-functionalist traditions, precisely because the 
connection with the things of the real world, of everyday life, is not made.173 
Bourdieu continues his attempt to remedy the situation by considering the 
question of government commissions, royal or otherwise, that undertake 
work, first, historically, for the King, and then later, as an instrument of 
government, that investigates matters of prime importance. A public problem 
is legitimated and given the weight of the state to establish its authority. 
Commissions depend on a form of alchemy, the alchemy of the state, which 
is called upon each time the commission meet. The commission changes 
particular individual events into universal principles, and draws on the 
resources of the state to make it so.174 Spinoza’s notion of the obsequium is 
useful in explaining how this system of authority works. It refers to respect 
that individuals may have, not to other individuals, but to the social order, 
and particularly the symbolic order.175 This acceptance of the social order, 
which Bourdieu claims resides in every one of us, explains, in part, the basis 
on which the state’s power resides. Thus members of a commission must be 
people who are ‘respectable’, who, in their individual lives, command 
authority from a majority of the population ; they must be people who know 
the rules of the game. The official truth generated by such commissions, or 
by such slogans as Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité, which is ensconced over the 
doorway of every French town hall, hardly provides the template for the 
activities of all agents of the state, or of society, but it does resonate in 
people’s minds. As Bourdieu puts it : 
(This official truth) exists both in a certain type of structure – in the social 
ministries, for example, there are objective principles of equalization, a claim 
to equalize – but also in people’s minds, as the representation of something 
that one might well say does not exist, but that people agree would be better 
if it did.176 
The effect of the state is thus to establish a condition of obsequium towards 
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things that might not exist, but which, in many minds, should be brought 
into being. Instead of an opposition between the state and civil society, which 
had often been proposed, it might be more useful to talk about a continuum 
between the two which expresses the degree to which public resources, 
whether material or symbolic, are available.177 Bourdieu is overturning many 
of the distinctions that left theorists have taken for granted till this point, the 
distinction between state and civil society being an obvious example. 
Bourdieu’s attempt here is clearly not to say that the state is a merely a myth, 
but to reinvent what he sees before him – to argue that the state exists, 
clearly, but in a very different form than is normally taken to be true, and not 
just by the general public, but by the theoretical community who are 
concerned with state theorizing as well. 
 
In the lecture of February 1, 1990, Bourdieu reviews his last lecture material, 
aiming for clarity. But beyond this, he now consciously seeks the origins of 
the state. And he starts by trying to identify, in his early work on the Algerian 
Kabyle, who spoke, first of all, for the people. In traditional societies, these 
were sages and prophets, sometimes the poet. He uses the obscure term 
‘prosopopoeia’ to refer to someone speaking on behalf of an abstract idea, 
such as wisdom, or a nation. For example, De Gaulle would speak on behalf 
of France, as if he imagined himself to be the embodiment of the nation, 
which, of course, he did. Why is the genesis of the state important, Bourdieu 
asks178 -because the things that later become invisible and obscured are still 
available to see at this early stage. The prophet catches the group he speaks 
for in a trap because he captures the collective ideal. In the Kabyle the 
amusnaw179 speaks of the honour of the group and the highest value of the 
people, and this is why, Bourdieu tells us, losing face is of prime importance. 
Thus : 
The official … is the public. It is the idea that the group has of itself, and the 
idea that it wants to give of itself, the representation (in the sense of mental 
image but also of theatrical performance) that it wants to give of itself when 
it presents itself as a group.180 
The original source of the meaning of the word ‘public’ lies in the distinction 
between the individual, the private, the unique, on the one hand, and the 
collective, on the other. ‘Public’ also refers to the visible, to the openly said. 
The theatrical metaphor is useful because we can describe the public as 
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taking place on stage and not behind the scenes. The official thus must 
become an agent of universalization and moralization.181 Following Goffman, 
Bourdieu speaks of the formal attitude of waiters, who, when they come 
through the swing door of the kitchen, assume the public role of the 
representative of the restaurant, the embodiment of dignity and honour, 
while behind the scenes, gossip about the customers, back-biting, nail-biting, 
smoking and all the private habits take place.  
 
The origins of the state are connected to three kinds of people, first of all, 
with the wise men, the prophets, the amusnaw. Second, they derive from the 
work of jurists, lawyers, who, as Bourdieu says, create the early state : 
The state is a legal fiction produced by lawyers who produced themselves as 
lawyers by producing the state.182 
Then, there are also a third category, jurists who are close to being prophets, 
and here he is thinking of English canon lawyers of the twelfth century who 
were the first to put forward the idea of the state.183 They are jurists who 
Bourdieu describes as ‘still close to the amusnaw.184 By this he means people 
who still question in whose name they speak. Later this all dissolves when the 
state emerges in its fully fashioned form, because it is clear who one is 
speaking for – the juridical system, the courts, the government, the Minister 
of Justice, and so on. In the early days, this understanding is still in the 
process of construction. These early beginning reveal things that are still 
present in the legal system, but which have now become invisible. They have 
become invisible because a field of juridical practice has emerged into which 
jurists are now dissolved, and the origins of this field have now become 
obscured. This invisibility is connected with polysemy, the various forms of 
meaning and discourse that are associated with judicial work. Jurists and their 
precursors needed to learn to speak on several levels to suit the audience. 
Secrets are hidden in some settings, revealed in others. The naming of issues 
is a first step to dealing with, making legal, authorising, and perhaps, 
ameliorating social issues.185 The prophet thus names what the group or, 
even less, the individual, cannot name. Thus : 
What transforms singular discourse into common and sacred discourse, into 
common sense, into discourse capable of receiving the consent of the totality 
of individuals and thus generating consensus, is rhetorical alchemy, the 
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alchemy of the oracle.186 
Bourdieu continues with an assessment of alternative theories of the origin of 
the state that he had promised earlier, but from which he had digressed to try 
to clarify an earlier argument. Bourdieu starts by imagining a situation of 
linguistic anarchy prior to the origin of the state in which anyone could say 
anything and no rules of legitimacy apply. The state’s purpose is to 
‘concentrate linguistic capital’187 and to bring order to anarchy. What 
Bourdieu calls ‘this utopia of anarchy’188 is imagined by Kafka’s The Trial. 
Kafka raises, again and again, the question of the authority of the lawyer, but 
this kind of thinking cannot continue indefinitely. In the end, this has to stop 
and the place it stops is the state. So what kind of research should we do on 
the state? Bourdieu goes on to elaborate such a strategy, but this is hardly 
straightforward in his view, and he must first clear away a lot of underbrush 
and rubbish before this can be revealed. Economic arguments are clearly 
one-dimensional and inadequate. Much of Marxist theory might lie in this 
direction. Then he interrogates Shmuel Eisenstadt’s The Political Systems of 
Empires189 as a possible model. His hope here is to give him a positive 
reading, and to introduce him to a French audience. Eisenstadt’s comparative 
approach allows him to draw out patterns in the rise of nation-states, to 
provide typologies, and shows the rise of state to be a qualitative shift in 
history.190 He then considers Perry Anderson’s Passages from Antiquity to 
Feudalism and Lineages of the Absolutist State,191 as a possible pathway forward, 
but knowing, as we do, that Anderson sits at the centre of the Marxist 
intellectual project, one is not hopeful that this review will turn out well. 
Bourdieu starts by telling us that Anderson’s basic question is ‘completely 
naïve’, and things do not get better from there. Indeed Bourdieu seems so 
furious with Anderson that he moves away from the topic almost 
immediately, and while the section was planned to be a review, it rapidly 
becomes an avoidance. To sum up, Bourdieu notes : 
I had intended to compare Eisenstadt and Perry Anderson in order to show 
you how, beneath the apparent opposition between a structural-functionalist 
tradition and a Marxist tradition, there are many resemblances. To sum up 
very quickly : Eisenstadt is functionalism for everyone, whereas Anderson is 
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functionalism for certain people. Eisenstadt asks what the functions of the 
state are for the totality of the social order, all classes together, whereas 
Anderson examines the class functions for the dominant of that time, that is, 
the feudalists. But the essential thing is that they are both functionalists. 
Instead of asking what the state does … they deduce what it does from the 
functions they posit almost a priori, such as the function of maintaining 
unity, serving etc.192 
Having dismissed these two authors with a rapid barrage of anti-functionalist 
criticism, Bourdieu then turns his attention to Barrington Moore and his 
theory of the three routes that lead to capitalism, fascism and democracy.193 
Barrington Moore intends to follow the landed upper classes and the 
peasants into revolutions as they move towards these three possible futures. 
Bourdieu finds him ‘the most consistent comparativist’.194 Bourdieu briefly 
rehearses Moore’s argument, focusing on the relationships between the large, 
landed propertied interests, the peasants and the urban bourgeoisie. Thus the 
three end points result from different combinations of these three interests. 
A balance results in democracy. Domination by feudal interests results in 
some form of dictatorship. 
 
Bourdieu now summarises where his argument has led him195 : 
I recalled that the agents of the state are characterised by the fact that they 
are invested with functions that are called official, that is, with official access 
to official speech, the speech that is current for official instances and the 
state. You could say that the state is ultimately the place where official 
speech, regulations, rules, order, mandate and appointment is current. In this 
logic, the state is characterised by being the site of a universally recognized 
power, recognized even when challenged …196 
Bourdieu now turns to a topic he has been threatening to cover for some 
pages – the genesis of the state. He plans to do this under two headings – 
first to show what is necessary in order to produce such a history, and then 
to indicate what is novel about his approach. So, what is involved in 
providing a history of the state? Providing a detailed logic of state formation 
seems difficult, and perhaps impossible, as Anderson and Eisenstadt have 
shown in what Bourdieu has already, directly (in the case of Anderson) and 
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indirectly (in the case of Eisenstadt) argued to be a false hope. France and 
Britain are to be his case studies, since they provided the model for state 
formation in many other nations. Marx made similar assumptions, using 
England as the classic case of capitalist development. Marc Bloc uses these 
two nations as archetypes. Bourdieu then briefly sets out his theory of genetic 
structuralism.197 As sociologists, our job is to study the origins of structures, 
both individual and social. It is easier to do the job when one is clear about 
the methods and the nature of the craft involved, Bourdieu argues, and this is 
what he is sorting out in these pages – elements of a method. Thus his 
genetic structuralism is to be separated from traditional history by being 
explicit about method, by examining the logic of historical change, and by 
analysing social fields.198 Bourdieu then invokes his field theory, his 
arguments about games, capitals, struggles and strategies. He does this by way 
of an example – the game of chess.199 Fields are locations in social space 
where actors compete for capitals (valued goods) according to a set of rules, 
which are both durable and changeable as a result of the actions of agents. As 
they engage in these struggles, agents develop strategies for success. To 
describe the genesis of a field, therefore, is to describe the origins of a game, 
a game of deadly seriousness. Then, in typical Bourdieu fashion, he peppers 
his presentation with comments that take the reader’s breath away. For 
example :  
The state has been a great protector of ignorance, in the sense that it can 
serve as the repository for everything that people are unable to explain in the 
social world, and it has been endowed with every possible function …200 
Bourdieu is exhorting us not to assign a logic to the state that does not exist. 
The state cannot explain everything, but that is the role that some historians 
have appropriated to it. Structures are durable but they are not unchanging. 
Social agents are not merely bearers of this social structures – Bourdieu is 
warning us against Althusserian structuralism, and invoking instead a world 
in which structures and agents engage in a constant dialectic within fields of 
struggle. Bourdieu then warns us further against the error of anachronism, 
the belief held among some historians that things are much the same as they 
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were in the 16th century – that a very similar character to De Gaulle, for 
example, existed in 1546. The rules of the game have changed and these 
parallels will not hold. Bourdieu then ends his lecture by examining ‘the two 
faces of the state’.201 Does this approach to the origins of the state add 
anything, ask Bourdieu? : 
The state is a Janus about which it is impossible to state a positive property 
without simultaneously stating a negative property, a Hegelian property 
without a Marxist property, a progressive property without a regressive and 
oppressive property. This is troubling for people who like to think that 
everything will turn out rosy …202 
Describing the origins of the state is to describe the origins of a social field, 
the field of legitimate politics : 
To give the genesis of the state is to give the genesis of the field, in which 
politics is played out, symbolized, dramatized in prescribed forms, and by the 
same token the people with the privilege of entering the game have the 
privilege of appropriating for themselves a particular resource that we can call 
the ‘universal’ resource.203 
This emerging field is the field of the universal, the realm of the public good, 
yet, at the same time, the establishment of privilege and the concentration of 
resources is also taking place. Privilege comes with the rise of the universal. 
Thus legitimate culture is that culture that the state authorises. Diversity is 
now replaced by uniformity. The creation of national standards requires the 
dissolution of local ways of doing things. This process gives rise to a caste of 
state managers – the state’s nobility, who Bourdieu calls the ‘monopolizers’ 
of the universal.204 
 
The lectures we have just discussed constitutes the presentations offered 
during 1990.205 In 1991 in January, some eleven months later, Bourdieu 
returned to his subject for a further nine lectures. At the start of the new 
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year, he warns the audience that he plans now to follow two themes – the 
genesis of the state, an old topic, as well as focusing on the structure and 
functioning of the state. 
 
The state, Bourdieu begins on 10 January 1991, is an impossible topic. It 
condemns the sociologist to modesty.206 Thus he feels it is necessary to set 
out the challenges that make the task of state analysis impossible, but also 
essential, at one and the same time. He reminds us of his genetic structuralist 
approach lest we have forgotten what it means, the last lecture being almost a 
year ago. To do this work, the sociologist must liberate themselves from pre-
existing categories of thought, or risk the burden of being constrained by 
what is already known. The problem is that we all know the state – the state 
is within us, and we have opinions about it : 
When I fill in a bureaucratic form, which is a great state invention, when I fill 
in a request or sign a sickness certificate … when I do operations of this 
kind, I understand the state perfectly: I am, in a sense, a man of the state, the 
state-made man, and by the same token I understand nothing about it.207 
He proposes using the example of spelling to illustrate the point further, but 
first he veers off into another territory. To do the kind of work he is planning 
to do, one must break with common sense, both in the scientific world and 
in the world of the ordinary. He cites the rise of state theorists (Poulantzas 
and others) in the sixties as a resurgence in a long-neglected field, and he 
mentions the reaction to this work in the writings of Theda Skocpol and 
others. Then Bourdieu veers, somewhat alarmingly, into another new area 
concerned with housing policy, citing earlier work he had undertaken, then, 
in another lurch, he examines network analysis.208 Here Bourdieu sides clearly 
with the structuralists against the simply interactional theorists. Then he is off 
again in another direction, and we are hanging to his coat-tails – now he uses 
the example of the reform of the teaching system,209 and then a mention of 
an international crisis, before returning to an examination of schools. Thus : 
There is a specific logic of the state, and these constraints, regularities, 
interests, this logic of operation of the bureaucratic field, may be the origin of 
a dependence or independence in relation to external interests …210 
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The point Bourdieu is making is that whatever the state does, it serves some 
interests more than others, and usually the dominant, rather than the 
dominated. This is, of course, a theory of domination writ large, in every 
syllable and every sentence. So, says our author, we must break with grand 
theories, break with common sense, remain aware of what we are doing, and 
especially our epistemological assumptions.211 Bourdieu then lets us into his 
strategies for escaping these problems. Given that the state shapes our 
thinking, a genetic structuralist approach, opening up the origins of the state 
through this line of reasoning, allows us to see through it. This permits us to 
bear witness to a moment when the state was questioned, and the very notion 
of state control lay in the balance. The problem with the state is that it very 
soon becomes doxic – it becomes part of the natural order of things, the only 
way to think, and so on. But history cannot be seen as a linear business. 
There’s no going backwards, that’s for sure, but at any given moment, there 
are a series of possibilities going forward. ‘History destroys possibilities’, says 
Bourdieu.212 Similarly, the state says ‘that’s the way it is’,213 cutting off 
alternatives, and arguing instead that what exists is the only possible state of 
affairs. 
 
Bourdieu finally returns to spelling, a topic he had mentioned early on, and 
from which he had veered away. Spelling, according to Bourdieu, has filled 
more column inches recently (1991) in Le Figaro than the Gulf War.214 This 
somewhat odd occurrence has captured his attention. Spelling is tied closely 
to the ‘right way to write’, to the logic of the state and to the social ordering 
of things. Thus to raise the question of spelling also raises the larger question 
of the authorized language, and the defence of the culture in general. It is a 
site of difference and hierarchy. Those who can spell well, who ‘get it right’ 
establish themselves in a certain location in the hierarchy, just as those who 
defend Latin do so because their knowledge of Latin identifies them as 
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especially educated people over and above others. Thus, Bourdieu concludes : 
The genesis of the state … is the genesis of space within which … a mode of 
symbolic expression is imposed in a monopolistic fashion : you have to speak 
in the correct manner, and in this manner alone. The unification of the 
linguistic market, the unification of the market in writing that is coextensive 
with the state, is made by the state as it makes itself. One of the ways in 
which the state makes itself is by making a standardized spelling …215 
To establish the genesis of the state, one must interrogate two sets of facts – 
on the one hand, the vast historical terrain which one must encounter, and 
on the other hand, theories of the state. Bourdieu begins with an analysis of 
theories of state genesis, and the work of Norbert Elias.216 He takes Elias to 
be developing a neo-Weberian theory. In The Civilizing Process217 Elias explores 
the rise of the state as the exercising of power over a territory by the 
monopoly over the use of physical violence. Elias is original and useful in 
providing his account of how the private power of the king becomes the 
public power of the state, but there is little discussion of the symbolic. Two 
processes are at work in the rise of the state, according to the Elias theory. 
The first is the ‘gradual concentration of instruments of violence’,218 along 
with the capacity to tax in the hands of a particular ruler or administration. 
This process is similar to the rise of a monopoly in a market. Monopolization 
may come about at the end of a series of battles for domination. But the rise 
of the state may also mean the beginning of a peaceful era, in which old 
battles for control are now at an end. It leads to a balance between the king 
and his subjects.219 This gives rise to a complication : 
The holder of power becomes increasingly dependent on his dependants, 
who become increasingly numerous.220 
The power of the state starts in the hands of a small number of people, and 
passes through the central figure of the king. But as the state develops, a 
larger number of people are involved in the emerging process of state power. 
A strategic field of the political starts to develop – the beginnings of a 
bureaucracy. 
 
Bourdieu now examines Charles Tilly’s arguments about the origins of the 
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state.221 Tilly’s reasoning goes beyond that of Elias in that he seeks to account 
for more states, and to examine common features and differences between 
states. But, like Elias, he ignores the symbolic dimensions of domination. 
Tilly does show the uniqueness of the French and English cases, rather than 
assuming these cases to be typical. Bourdieu then rehearses a series of 
questions raised by Tilly. Europe seems to form a series of concentric circles, 
with weak states at the periphery, strong states at the centre. Why is this so? 
Why do states treat cities in different ways? And, third, why does power vary 
among city-state and empires? The answers lie in the rise of physical and 
economic force. Towns accumulate economic capital ; states accumulate 
physical force.222 Tilly then proposes a series of stages that economic 
concentration goes through. In the first stage, monarchs extract rent from 
feudal structures. Then the states draw on capitalists who lend to them. 
Finally, a taxation system is put into place. At the same time a concentration 
of coercive forces is occurring. First, monarchs raise armies through servants 
and those who have obligations to the king. Then mercenaries step forward 
to fill the role. Finally, armies are absorbed into the state. By the 19th century, 
these two processes – taxation and coercion – were both embedded in the 
state. Thus you can develop a theory of three stages – first a phase of what 
Bourdieu calls ‘patrimonalism’ based on feudalism ; then a phase of 
‘brokerage’ involved with service for money ; and finally, a period of 
specialization within the state. This is not a pattern that happens evenly or at 
the same time in different states. Thus, Bourdieu concludes, three pathways 
lead to the rise of the state – the rise of the coercive trajectory (Russia) ; the 
capitalist trajectory (Venice) and the mixed trajectory (England) where the 
state, formed early on, mixed with a large commercial city. 
 
Bourdieu then takes up arguments posed by Corrigan and Sayer as to 
whether the state functions well for all because it imposes order and brings 
stability. Bourdieu argues that their approach is quite different from the 
strategy followed by Tilly and Elias. In contrast to the others, they do not 
accept the state as an agent of coercion, and as a reflection of economic 
power, a view Gramsci also distanced himself from. Bourdieu quotes them in 
the following way : 
Marxist theories forget ‘the meaning of state activities, forms, routines and 
rituals – for the constitution and regulation of social identities, ultimately our 
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subjectivities’.223 
Here Bourdieu appears to have found two sympathetic fellow-travellers who 
understand the significance of the symbolic role of the state. As in Bourdieu’s 
own arguments, they claim the state as a codifier and a classifier, and argue 
that, through this kind of work, the state ‘imposes a legitimate view on the 
social world’.224 Corrigan and Sayer leave aside considerations of physical 
violence and economic capital – what they focus their attention on, instead, is 
the cultural revolution of the state. In Bourdieu’s take, this approach : 
… (privileges) … an explicitly Durkheimian perspective (in) what they call 
the ‘moral dimension of state activity’ ; they describe the construction of the 
state as the construction … of a set of common representations and 
values.225 
They follow Gramsci as seeing the state as ‘domesticating the dominated’.226 
This raises the issue of what the welfare state is up to – does it provide 
service, or does it instead function as a method of control, and, of course, it 
does both. Thus the state establishes what might be called a nation and a 
national identity. They are thus able to say what it means to be English : 
… ‘the supposed reasonableness, moderation, pragmatism, hostility to 
ideology, “muddling through”, quirkiness, eccentricity, and so on …’227 
What Bourdieu takes Corrigan and Sayer to mean is that the state is a system 
of rituals.228 This emerging nationalism saved England, according to this 
view, from revolutionary change, because it was clear what was at stake – the 
widely-held belief in the nation as a well-established and distinct entity 
worthy of protection from its subjects. Bourdieu finds their argument 
confused, and he sets out to clarify the English situation. Is the English case 
typical? Bourdieu starts by citing the French case in comparison as an 
example of universalism of an extreme form with a highly centralised state. 
Can the same be said of England?  Second, Bourdieu believes that without 
the conceptual tools available from his repertoire – symbolic capital, 
symbolic violence – Corrigan and Sayer cannot make sense of what is going 
on. They cannot explain, in particular, the voluntary submission of persons to 
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the will of the state. The state does this by wielding what Bourdieu calls 
‘symbolic power’. Corrigan and Sayer argue that what is unique about the 
English case is the persistence of a series of ‘anachronisms’ that do not 
remain in other societies, which allowed the bourgeois revolution to succeed. 
The irrational, non-bureaucratic style of the state allowed the English to go 
forward into capitalism with few constraints. The state remained ill-formed 
until the 19th century, and appointments were often patronage-based. As well, 
the monarchy remained at the centre of government. They thus challenge 
Marx’s depiction of the French Revolution as the ‘measure of all 
revolutions’.229 Bourdieu will go further in what follows. He proposes to 
argue that the French Revolution is a false revolution, in which continuities 
are as important as changes, and which then generated a series of false 
questions about revolution around the world.230 
 
In his fourth lecture in 1991 on the state,231 Bourdieu reminds us of the 
Corrigan/Sayer arguments. Corrigan and Sayer suggest that the archaic state 
structures in England were no obstacle to the rise of capitalism, and indeed 
may have allowed more freedom to the emerging economic form, and this 
may be true also of Japan. This argument is directly at odds with Weberian 
notions of rationality, and the need for new capitalism to have an efficient 
state to depend upon.232 This is doxic thinking in sociology, and it is to 
Corrigan’s and Sayer’s credit that they break with this line of thinking. Thus, 
it is not rationality and law that hold society together ; it is culture. These 
forces of cultural cohesion held English society together even as the forces of 
capitalism came flooding into the picture. 
 
The same issue arises among Japanese Marxists as it did among English 
Marxists – why no revolution here? Feudalism still remained, and the 
absolute monarchy still persisted. The economic system still relied on an 
ancient system of land tax even in the modern universe. Finally, the Meiji 
restoration was supported, not by the urban bourgeoisie, as should have 
happened according to certain well-established theories, but by the samurai 
class. Bourdieu takes the view that the Meiji Revolution was a conservative 
revolution,233 by which he means a movement that sought to restore older 
forms of society. It was led by ‘petty samurai’ who sought larger power and 
better economic conditions, all this under the guise of a request for universal 
rights. 
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For many centuries, and perhaps from as early as the eighth century onwards, 
Japan was a bureaucratized state with all the characteristics of the state – the 
use of writing, bureaucratic division of labour, state actions by functionaries 
and other familiar qualities.234 The samurai, displaced and discarded, affected 
a transformation to become a class of intellectuals and bureaucrats. Thus to 
explain the ‘Japanese Miracle’, one must start with these understandings of 
the highly bureaucratised and early established state, just like England. In 
France, cultural capital very quickly became a path to power, and the same 
process occurred in Japan. People were thus bound up with the state. 
Educational and cultural capital are thus closely bound to the economic 
elements of the ‘Japanese Miracle’. And : 
English culture was … constructed against the French model. ‘Englishness’ 
was defined against France ; each of the adjectives that are constitutive of 
‘Englishness’ can be set against an adjective characterizing ‘Frenchness’. 
Japanese culture is a cultural artefact constructed against the foreign with the 
intention of rehabilitation. Japan was a nation dominated but not colonized. 
It experienced subjection to European domination without for all that being 
directly subject to this domination, as was China. Because of this, Japanese 
culture was inspired by the intention of rehabilitation, of ‘dignification’ in the 
face of the contempt of Westerners.235 
Cultural orthodoxy was sustained through two mechanisms – the school and 
the state. But then schools often play this role in a variety of countries. In the 
case of the French, through an imperialist mechanism, the claim was made 
for the construction of a universal culture that was of value to the world 
entire. This imperialist claim, familiar also in English examples, is now made 
globally on behalf of the United States. Thus culture always has within it 
elements of domination and nationalism,236 offering a legitimacy to the social 
order as it is. There are thus forms of domination that are very gentle, and 
not coercive in the physical sense at all. Consider mathematics – a science 
that is abstract and far removed from politics. And yet it is at the heart of 
technology and capitalist progress. It offers : 
…a perfect domination, being the domination of reason, and an implacable 
domination, as there is nothing to oppose reason with except reason itself, or 
a still more reasonable reason.237 
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Thus, as well as brutality, physical violence and physical force, there are also 
forms of symbolic domination that are perfectly decent and reasonable. This 
means that the old models based on ideas of infrastructure and 
superstructure, of physical violence and coercion alone, will no longer work. 
We will need to look elsewhere for a more satisfactory theory of the state and 
its origins. 
 
What, then, are the theoretical problems raised by Corrigan and Sayer’s 
book?238 Bourdieu starts by using a ‘little-known’ argument from Hume, who 
wonders at the ease by which people allow themselves to be governed. Hume 
argues that force and opinion are the only things behind such a condition, 
and thus, implicitly, that justice, reason and fair play are nothing to do with it. 
For Bourdieu, the ‘symbolic dimension’ will play a major part in the 
explanation. Bourdieu tries to answer Hume’s question directly – how is that 
order is so easily managed? He reminds us of the theoretical apparatus that 
he has already assembled – symbolic power, symbolic capital, symbolic 
violence – they are sitting in the wings ready to be brought onto the stage. 
For Bourdieu, relations of symbolic power are no different from relations of 
physical power – there is no antagonism between the two. Those who submit 
know they are submitting. Their act of submission is also an act of cognition, 
an act of recognizing their acceptance of domination : 
To understand acts of obedience, therefore, you have to conceive social 
agents not as particles in a physical space … but as particles who think their 
superiors or subordinates with mental and cognitive structures … I believe 
that in order to understand this almost magical power that the state holds, 
you have to examine cognitive structures and the contribution the state 
makes to their production.239 
Here Bourdieu seems to ascribe to the state almost mythical powers that 
create ‘structuring structures that are applicable to all the things of the world, 
and in particular to social things’.240 Most interesting to Bourdieu is what he 
calls ‘the belief effect’, the fact that most people stop at a stop sign, even if a 
policeman is nowhere to be found. The state thus produces a state of social 
order without resorting to coercion, except as a last resort. In this view, the 
symbolic comes first. It is the accumulation of symbolic capital that precedes 
any material or coercive forces that might be applied to an individual. The 
state forms a moral and a logical conformity, largely through the work of the 
school system. Part of this process involves a series of rituals, often taking 
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the form of examinations and certifications, that separate out those who pass 
them from those who don’t. Thus the school is a place, not just of 
certification, but also of consecration and of the establishment of difference. 
One cannot read these passages without the thought coming to mind that 
Bourdieu is ascribing to the state a ubiquitous power that other parts of his 
argument, the part that ascribes agency to individuals and groups, would 
reject. He is bending the stick too far in the other direction. 
 
But for the moment Bourdieu continues down his integrationist path, arguing 
that the state brings together not just timetables, but also time itself, 
established on a national level, rather than being localized, as well as 
schedules, calendars, syllabuses, examinations, certifications, legal structures 
and so on. More than this, the state also frames mental structures and forms 
of cognition. Paradoxically for Bourdieu, this is precisely what Marxists 
cannot explain even if they talk about it the whole time, and this is because 
the theoretical apparatus does not exist in their schema to take on the task.241  
 
In his lecture of 14 February 1991, Bourdieu starts with a long aside on the 
difficulties of teaching sociology, and of being a sociologist,242 and it is only 
after several pages of self-analysis that he returns to his topic. But he finds 
his rhythm again towards the end when he starts to chart new territory again, 
and to bring together some findings that have been only implicitly rendered 
until now : 
The state is the product of the gradual accumulation of different kinds of 
capital – economic, physical force, symbolic, cultural or informational …243  
The task for the sociologist is to characterise the qualities of these capitals, 
their balance and their form, in different social conditions and historical 
epochs. And this question is attached to another - how do the private capitals 
of individual lives come to be part of the public capital of the state?244 
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Bourdieu acknowledges his focus is on the emergence of the state in the 
West, and accepts he cannot avoid ideological criticism for not spreading his 
net wider. In Strayer’s argument,245 while it can be claimed that there are 
similarities between the early Chinese state and the later emerging states of 
Europe, those who established European states were completely ignorant of 
this history, and thus could not be accused of borrowing from existing 
patterns of government elsewhere. Strayer goes further to suggest that the 
early European states were very different when they emerged from anything 
to be found in ancient Greece or in the Asiatic model. These early empires 
were largely military operations, but they did not involve the citizenry much 
in their day-to-day operations. Thus, everyday life under imperial rule at the 
margins of the Empire was often little affected by battles and power struggles 
elsewhere at the core of the Empire. The emergence of the city-state changes 
everything.246 Here, in these small societies, citizens are very closely 
integrated, and loyalty is very strong. But Bourdieu doesn’t believe we can 
transfer these understandings simply into the modern world. For him, these 
states were very different from our own, because our notions of patriotism 
stem from a schooling system that did not exist in these earlier periods. 
Strayer argues that the virtues of these small societies were combined with 
the territorial range of Empires to form modern European states. But what 
needs to be added to Strayer’s account, Bourdieu concludes, is an analysis of 
symbolic capital. And it is to the question of symbolic capital that Bourdieu 
turns in his next lecture. As we have already heard, even the most violent 
physical act is associated with symbolic violence as well. Thus, Bourdieu 
wants to claim : 
… there is no physical effect in the human world that is not accompanied by 
a symbolic effect. The strange logic of human actions means that brute force 
is never only brute force : it exerts a form of seduction, persuasion, which 
bears on the fact that it manages to obtain a certain form of recognition.247 
But this extension beyond violence towards the symbolic is equally true of 
other forms of capital, such as economic capital. Wealth is never simply 
wealth, since it carries with it a rich semiological baggage of status, power and 
influence. And it is clear that cultural capital and social capital are, by their 
very nature, deeply symbolic from the start. Nobility is a pure form of 
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symbolic capital. The term originates from a sense of being recognized, being 
notable.  
 
As the state develops, it takes on various tasks. This occurs in four stages, the 
first being an attempt to concentrate various forms of capital, which means to 
universalise, among other things, symbolic capital.248 The second stage involves 
the structuring of the dynastic state, in which state property is personal 
property. This results in an analysis of family wars. In the third stage, which 
he calls the movement ‘from the king’s house to raison d’état’, there is a 
move from a family-based state to a bureaucratic structure. The final stage 
involves the movement from the bureaucratic state to the welfare state. 
 
Bourdieu then turns his attention to the dynastic state.249 We may, in this 
process, he argues, be guilty of using contemporary terms to describe 
historical conditions which require different forms of analysis. The major 
bond holding these states together was usually the loyalty subjects had to the 
leader - a king or a prince. What forms of concentration took place during 
this period? Bourdieu suggests that military, economic and symbolic power 
were all being brought together in this emerging structure. There is also a 
meta-capital at work in the new régime - the capacity to create capital itself. 
The developing state provides itself with the power to preside over all forms 
of capital. Thus the state might be best considered as : 
… a field within which agents struggle to possess a capital that gives power 
over other fields.250 
Military power and taxation are clearly elements of this early form of state. 
To create a military force for the state also requires private forces to come 
under the control of the state, or to disarm. Thus all forms of concentration 
involve a process of dispossession and separation, whether this be physical 
capital, cultural capital, social capital or symbolic capital. Physical force is 
required for two discrete purposes – to establish the authority of the state to 
do what it needs to do internally, such as raise taxes and keep order, as well 
as to defend the national territory against external enemies. 
 
The second question to consider is taxation. The emergence of a tax system 
is a prominent element in the formation of economic capital at the centre, 
though clearly land held by the King also plays a prominent part. And there 
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are also other powers available ; the right to coin money, to set exchange 
rates, to establish a central bank, all new mechanisms by which to 
concentrate wealth within the state. As Polanyi and others have shown, the 
state did not come into being by accident, but was, in part, a result of 
mercantilist needs for an economic space to inhabit. The forming of a 
taxation system was part of this process of construction. Taxation at this 
stage becomes universal, and not merely a feudal arrangement in which funds 
are exchanged between people who know each other. Once you accept the 
obligation of taxation, you also accept membership in the state’s community. 
The usefulness of physical violence to gather taxation and to carry out the 
state’s functioning is only made possible by the presence of symbolic capital 
– the value of the things that the state is doing. Thus if taxation supports a 
war against an enemy, the symbolic capital at work lies in the valuing of 
protecting the national borders. But all this has to happen in an important 
theatrical sense as well – the grandeur of the court, the presence of livery 
worn by bailiffs, in the world of ceremony, of the pomp and circumstance of 
Kings, all developed in order to create forms of symbolic capital that will 
allow the system to legitimate and sustain itself. Belief in the king is 
paramount, even if the agents of the King sometimes act unjustly.251 
 
Bourdieu now has two lectures left in the year, and he continues his 
discussion of taxation. Corrigan and Sayer remind us that resistance to 
taxation was widespread, overcome in part by the use of liveries among 
bailiffs to represent the king, acting in his name, and thus legitimate in the 
eyes of the citizenry, who valued their loyalty to the crown. Corruption was 
common, and the suspicion routinely arose that the state lackeys who 
gathered the taxes did not transmit all these funds to the king. The legitimacy 
of the state depended, then, on the degree to which the King could be called 
upon as the court of last resort, as well as on the emergence of national 
chauvinism, the need to secure boundaries.252 Bourdieu now considers the 
rise of the juridical market. During the 12th century in Europe a series of 
juridical structures emerged to dispense justice, some deriving from the 
church, others from commerce, or from towns and cities, yet more from the 
seigneurial system of landowning and peasantry. Bourdieu traces the way in 
which these disparate courts came together to create an unitary system. 
Haphazardly, unevenly and slowly, royal justice came to supersede other 
forms of justice. There is in this process the genesis of a logic that has no 
logic.253 The juridical system started to develop its own system of rules, while 
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the royal monopoly began to take over from the great landlords. What is at 
stake here is the establishment of a single game : 
Concentration should not be imagined as simply a process of capital 
accumulation, a game of marbles in which they all end up in the king’s 
possession … Where there were several games … there is now a single game, 
with the result that all players are summoned to locate themselves in this 
space of play, and occupy a certain position within it.254 
This case study suggests a more general trend, which is an interest in the 
universal, and the formation of institutions designed to capture the universal. 
At the same time, the concentration of cultural capital is also developing. The 
cultural market becomes unitary. The rise of a national cultural capital market 
cannot be separated from the rise of a national symbolic capital market. 
There must be hierarchies, ranks, ‘great men’. The state takes over the 
cultural patronage market from private individuals,255 and thus begins to take 
an interest in the national cultural economy. In 1661, Louis XIV arrested 
Nicolas Fouquet, ‘the last of the great patrons’, and immediately moved to 
take over the artists that he had been supporting.256 In short : 
The state therefore concentrates culture, and the idea of the unification of 
mental structures should be borne in mind here, the fact that the state 
appropriates mental structures, producing a unified cultural habitus whose 
genesis it controls …257 
The law, a dimension of symbolic capital, thus concentrates symbolic capital 
itself. The state becomes ‘the central bank of symbolic capital.’258 All forms 
of social consecration come to fall within its ambit. While once the nobility 
were appointed ‘by nature’, by God, by tradition, once the king gained 
national dominion, noble rank could only be established by the royal court. 
In 1666 Louis XIV created a census of nobles, thus enabling him to judge 
and to rank nobles. A diffuse symbolic capital, localised, private and 
uncertain, is thus replaced by a unitary system, with coats of arms, 
hierarchies, genealogies. The state decides who can wear what, and thus 
determines the conditions and the outward manifestations of the symbolic 
market. The king has become : 
… ‘the fountain of honours, of office and of privilege’. In other words, he 
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was the unique source of symbolic power.259 
Symbolic power thus concentrates in the king, but then spreads out into 
society, creating a network of symbolic systems that, in turn, together 
constitute the field of the symbolic market. 
 
In his last lecture of this series,260 Bourdieu first turns to a ‘digression’, when 
he speaks of a programme on television seen the previous night featuring 
Bernard-Henri Lévy.261 He soon returns, however, to his theme, conscious 
that this is the last lecture of the academic year.262 The two-faced nature of 
the state preoccupies him here – the state as integrationist and unificatory, 
while simultaneously the instrument of monopolization and domination. 
Thus the rise of the cultural market is also the rise of cultural domination. He 
plans, in the new year, to trace the shift from the ‘personal state to the 
impersonal (or partly impersonal) state’.263 The state constructs itself as the 
source of the greatest capital of all, the holder of a meta-capital, the capacity 
to dominate all the fields of capitals, to decided what is of value and what is 
not, and to reign over the entire system of fields. But unification also has a 
cost. It also implies ‘de-particularization’, the loss of local difference and 
distinction. 
 
The rise of the state also implies control over territory. The rise of the state 
replaces control of space by tribes, by groups, by communities, by control of 
a wider territory by a central authority. In Algeria, this meant the French 
colonial state took over the management of territorial and social space from 
the centre, replacing centuries of tribal rule. This results from a dramatic shift 
in the system of domination. Thus the state ‘unifies and universalizes’.264 It 
does this in the field of symbolic goods just as it does in all the major forms 
of capital at work in the world. Education is the primary mechanism by 
which this happens. But this unification also leads to the destruction of local 
markets, as in the case of Bourdieu’s famous study of Béarnese farmers, who 
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could no longer find wives because new, better educated potential husbands 
were coming in to the community from outside the village, and providing 
marriage opportunities from the wider market that had not existed before.265 
Provincial accents become stigmatized : Paris becomes the standard by which 
all are judged. 
 
All this can be seen as a religious process. Weber saw that the rise of the 
clergy offered them a sanctified role, while banishing the laity to the world of 
the profane.266 Similarly, with the rise of the state, teachers can be seen to be 
consecrated by the state as sacred individuals blessed with cultural capital, 
while the laity, the students, come to be consecrated through the process of 
education. But, on the dark side, what this means also is that those who are 
not so consecrated, those who fail, those who do not gain certificates, 
diplomas, qualifications, degrees, are relegated to perpetual profanity, to the 
world of the dispossessed, a story teachers cannot easily hear. Thus the state 
produces nationalisms, but it also produces resistance, and anti-nationalisms, 
those who resist the state and wish to fight back.  
 
We come now to consider the last series of lectures Bourdieu was to 
undertake on his theory of the state.267 In his first lecture, he traces the shift 
from the personal power of the king to the impersonal power of the state. He 
begins by attempting to explain the logic of the dynastic state surrounding 
the person of the king. At the heart of this account is Bourdieu’s notion of 
‘reproduction strategies’.268 In order to understand the reproduction of ‘the 
king’s house’, one has first to come to grips with notions of system and 
strategies. The strategies involved include fertility and family planning, and 
questions of succession, which directly impinge on the problem of property 
division. Strategies must also focus on education of the heir, a process which 
provides the cultural foundation for the king’s symbolic capital to be 
accumulated. Curiously, as Bourdieu had already argued elsewhere, heirs 
often are not ready for inheritance.269 The new king must be readied to 
inherit the crown. Economic strategies must now be followed in order to 
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secure land and investments of other kinds. There must also be strategies 
conserving social capital, the networks of family and friends that is usually 
ascribed to women, even in advanced societies. Finally, Bourdieu introduces 
us to a word of his own invention – sociodicy.270 What he means by this is 
that part of the strategy for reproduction must include a justification of the 
world as it is. Thus we infer from his overly brief treatment that the ‘king in 
waiting’ must be inculcated with a profound belief in the justice and 
inevitability of the royal purpose if reproduction of the royal house is to 
occur successfully. All such strategies are part of a single intention – to assure 
the reproduction of a social system, in this case, the royal house. Once the 
king’s house is established and secured, it soon becomes apparent that the 
political world is part of the family world – the two are merged, one 
embedded in the other. The state and the royal become one and the same 
thing. 
 
In his next lecture,271 Bourdieu plans to show us how the system of 
domination developed between the dual logics surrounding the king and the 
state. A nation is far more than a monarch’s intentions, quite clearly. Instead 
Bourdieu wants us to consider the house as a ‘house thought’, that is, to 
understand the logic and the interests of the royal household. The house 
becomes a reality beyond individuals which has a logic to it – patrimony, 
territory, power, money – that all become part of the logic of the house. 
What distinguishes the king from other citizens is his divine quality, and thus 
he has a unique symbolic capital. But he can also play the feudal game, and 
battle for resources with the best of them. The king is thus the centre of the 
social system, and this aids in the process of the concentration of capitals. It 
is then possible to understand why the concentration of capitals occurred 
around the king, independent of his will – the king did not simply think the 
process into being, or make it happen through an act of private volition.272  
 
The reason to study the genesis of the state is to uncover the deep logic of 
the political system. Thus, we must understand that it was necessary to break 
with ‘house thought’ to start to develop a wider political logic, a logic of the 
state, that goes beyond the king’s household. Therefore we need to examine 
the very long process by which ‘house thought’ becomes ‘raison d’état’, the 
national interest. This process required the emergence of a new field. And the 
rules of this game are at odds with the existing game and its rules. To begin 
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with, there is something in the logic of the royal house that has an ‘affinity’273 
with the logic of the state. Belonging to the house means belonging to the 
logic of the house. But this logic contains within in a set of contradictions 
that must be overcome. These private powers are shifted, through the actions 
of jurists, to a condition whereby these private powers become public. At the 
same time, the lawyers and the jurists act as ideologists for the king.274 
 
The second condition to be overcome is that the king must try and find a 
system of reproduction of the family household which is in contradiction to the 
logic of the emerging world, a world of education. As early as the 12th. century 
in France, according to Bourdieu, state clerks were emerging who could point 
to their competence as a new source of authority – they could do things. Thus 
while the king had ownership, they could manage ; they could run the trains on 
time.275 Thus, there are those whose position rested on the dynastic principle, 
and those whose authority rested on competence and merit. Holders of 
dynastic power had, from the very start, to depend on experts to retain their 
power. They required military experts, financial experts, resource strategists, 
and political operatives. They required, in short, a primitive and very limited, 
form of bureaucracy. Thus : 
You see that the state is built up against nature, that the state is antiphysis276: 
no reproduction, no biological heredity and no transmission, not even of 
land, whereas the king and his family are on the side of blood, land and 
nature.277 
Thus the rise of the logic of the state is associated with the dismissal, the 
delegitimation, of succession. The means of production cannot be passed 
down by a law of nature, and with it, the guarantee of social status. At the 
same time, hereditary offices are disbanded. Thus what is at stake here is the 
contradiction between two modes of production.278 But in typical Bourdieu 
fashion, this is no mode of production that we have ever met before. He 
wants to claim that the best way to understand the French Revolution279 is to 
understand it as ‘the triumph of the mode of impersonal reproduction over 
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that of personal reproduction’.280 Thus the logic of the family is placed 
against the logic of cultural and educational competence of the state. The 
system is still riven today with these contradictions, between heirs and 
newcomers. The period of transition between these two modes of 
production is very long, from the 12th century to the French Revolution in 
the case of France. The systems are very hostile one to another :  
And you can say that in a certain sense the state nobility – the nobility of 
competence embodied in the noblesse de robe – expels the old nobility.281 
There was no simple transition from one mode to the other – indeed, the 
entire process is very complex and extended, and a mixed condition exists for 
a very long period of time. Nonetheless, the logic of the model still holds. 
The charismatic nature of the traditional hierarchy comes from God, blood, 
nature and the land, and it comes up against an emerging charismatic system, 
that of the gifted individual, endowed by ‘nature’ through some magical 
process, with qualities that are ineffable and inexplicable. Jurists were at the 
heart of this shift, those who carried the universalist claims forward. Jurists 
played a central role in establishing the state. Thus those bound up with the 
law came to confront those concerned with blood and heredity. In this 
struggle between the two logics, the king may call on the emerging state logic 
as an argument against his brothers who fight for dynastic control. A key 
question must be – whose interests are furthered by the emergence of the 
new logic of the state? People have interests, and not just simple economic 
interests, but instead very complex interests that require to be understood. 
For example, Bourdieu argues, receiving a salary from the state also involves 
a feeling of belonging, and this feeling of belonging, identity, is an interest of 
importance. At the same time, because of its particular powers, the state 
distributes symbolic capital. The king may have been the ‘fountain of all 
honours’,282 thus expressing his position as the most concentrated site of 
capital formation and accumulation, but doing this also confirmed on him a 
meta-capital – the capacity to decide which capitals count and which do not – 
a magical power. In the new logic, the state takes over this power.283  
 
As the state emerges, the king devolves power. Thus emerges a system of 
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networks and linkages that can lead to corruption at every level. And the 
process of state concentration has its limits – Bourdieu calls this problem the 
‘logic of compromise’.284 Corruption is thus structural, and the state must 
find ways to counteract this corruption. 
 
In his next lecture, Bourdieu again voices his disquiet about not being 
properly understood,285 before turning to the case of corruption in China. In 
traditional societies, it may be possible for the king to control the whole 
social system in more or less complete form. But as political systems become 
elaborated and extended over wider areas of territory, this is no longer 
possible. Filial piety could be an obvious source of corruption, and thus early 
Chinese bureaucrats sought to propose obedience to the Emperor as a higher 
social good than filial piety.286 But this strategy did not solve the problem of 
corruption, but rather enhanced it, because it was easier to exploit strangers 
than family members. Salaries are a recent invention. But in the Chinese case 
a ‘flow of illicit funds … irrigates the whole system from bottom to top’.287 
And, in the present French system, under neoliberalism, a system of 
corruption still remains, with high officials being paid large bonuses which 
are never revealed, never open to public scrutiny, never accessible : 
Here again there is institutionalized corruption, state privilege. And this 
institutionalized corruption is the work of those who denounce the 
corruption of intermediaries.288 
Bourdieu writes of a famous mandarin, Li Zhi, who wrote a book called A 
Book to Burn289 which examined mandarin corruption. He was, of course, 
reviled, and later committed suicide. Such a political system could not tolerate 
this kind of commentary. Bureaucracy and bureaucrats, for Bourdieu, are 
always placed in a position of ambiguity because of institutional corruption. 
Bourdieu had written earlier about trade union delegates, who are forced 
both to speak for themselves and for those they represent, a kind of ‘double 
game’.290 There is a way in which many people engage in acts of bad faith – 
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lying to oneself – as in the case of American lawyers who, while they act 
venally in their day-to-day practice, still adhere to a rhetoric of fair play, 
justice and decency to legitimate their work. Bureaucrats continually have 
choices, even if the logic of the office seems to suggest rationality, order and 
logic. They have choices about whether or not to act on a request, whether to 
act slowly or quickly, whether to ignore a demand or act immediately, 
whether to give a request a positive or a negative judgement, and so on.  
 
Bourdieu ends his lecture by turning to the theme of ‘the invention of the 
public’. First, the extension of the circuits of independence involves 
differentiation and inter-linked structures. Second, while differentiation is 
occurring, a sense of the collective work must also be accomplished 
simultaneously, which involves the constitution of the public. Third, the 
constitution of the public brought into being a series of conflicts that started 
to emerge among agents established by the new logics. The logic of the 
familial comes to be replaced by something that is, at first, ill-defined. Three 
processes are involved : the replacement of primary family allegiance by 
formal allegiance ; second, replacing family succession by reproduction based 
on the school system ; third, replacing rulers by a process of ‘central 
nomination’. Each of these processes can easily be observed.291 
 
The genesis of this public power preoccupies Bourdieu in his lecture of 14 
November 1991.292 In this process, both a public and a national reality come 
into being. His aim, he claims, for the last two years, has been to explain how 
the French Republic (RF) came to emerge. He begins by analysing the 
emergence of the republic. The process of universalisation was also 
accompanied by a new form of privatisation, in this case by the state nobility. 
Bourdieu asks early on : 
Are the bearers of nationalism not frequently those who have a private 
interest in the appropriation of the public?293 
The rise of the public is first examined by an assessment of English 
constitutional law. In this case, the power, initially in the hands of the king, 
was gradually divided, a process from which a bureaucracy slowly developed. 
Maitland, the English constitutional historian, examined the rise of what he 
called ‘the great officers of state’. These locations were previously in the 
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king’s house – the steward, the butler, the chamberlain, and so on. These 
same activities extended by a slow process over the national territory. Thus 
these proud officers who held ‘great positions’ could be said to be holding 
offices that were once entirely domestic, and which, of course, were servile 
positions. Some of these offices soon became hereditary, and at this point 
they apparently became unimportant, show offices of ‘exhibition and 
ceremony’,294 relegated to the universe of symbolism. Bourdieu argues that 
even today in France such figures take up diplomatic positions or they 
present TV shows – they thus retain their symbolic, ‘showy’ functions. And, 
of course, to say that symbolism amounts to nothing is an error of grave 
proportions, in his view. 
 
Alongside these honorary nobles there emerges a new class of office-holders 
appointed to do the real work of the honorary office. These new positions 
are legally warranted and sanctioned, subject to the law and ordained with 
legal powers. As this process develops, a new legal structure emerges 
simultaneously. Dynastic logic and indeterminacy are closely intertwined. But 
when precision, definition and explication come into being, the game 
changes. The king himself starts to become enveloped in a legal structure that 
shapes his field of action. Actions required must now be accompanied by 
some royal sign – the royal seal usually fulfils this role. Words are not enough 
anymore – written orders must be provided under the seal, the signature, 
counter-signed by an official. 
 
The seal for Bourdieu becomes a ‘magical imprint that condenses the whole 
state reality’.295 The question then arises – where does the magic come from? 
Bourdieu thinks he has found an answer in Mauss and his ‘Essay on 
magic’.296 Mauss argues that the effectiveness of the magician results from 
the world in which he operates, and the audience who allow him the 
possibility that magic does exist, and that he can perform it. In the same way, 
the state and its seal perform a similar function, a function which depends on 
the audience allowing that magic has occurred, and sustaining a belief in the 
seal, in the degree certificate, in the whole process of symbolic power. But 
the one power does not easily overcome the other. Instead what emerges for 
many years, and perhaps to this day, is a merged system that combines 
elements of both the dynastic state and the bureaucratic state. 
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Bourdieu now examines how royal seals are used. Originally, the parliaments 
only had powers designated by the king – instrumentalism was at work. The 
royal will had long been presented in the form of acts, charters, warrants, 
letters patent and other instruments bearing the royal seal. The chancellor 
initially had control of the seal. The chancellor was the first minister and the 
secretary of state for all departments. But because of the many duties of the 
chancellor, a general seal was soon replaced by the private seal of the king. 
Very soon, new seals appeared, representing other forms of office. A keeper 
of the privy seal was then appointed. This keeper then required a secretary, 
and this new office became the secretary of state. There is, in all this, a 
political ontology that suggests a ‘great chain of being’297 that starts with God 
and the king, and runs down through the high office-holders, through the 
chain of command, and down finally to the mere mortals that constitute the 
citizenry. The seal simply represents the process by which this authority is 
distributed. Documents are signed, first by the king, then by the king’s 
secretary, next by the keeper of the privy seal, and finally by the chancellor 
who places the great seal of the kingdom. In the end, the seals must provide a 
legal pathway to the king, and this suits him very well, since all power appears 
to originate with him.298 This process necessitates a hierarchical division of 
labour. Thus emerges a complex system of mutual guarantees. Bourdieu says : 
What I am describing is the genesis of a universe, the genesis of a division of 
labour of domination.299 
But as the system develops, and more people and more positions are added 
to this complex web of domination, the king, once in a position to control by 
himself, is now, in turn, controlled more and more by those who apparently 
serve him. A ‘depersonalization of power’300 now takes place in which, while 
the king may still remain the ‘fountain of all honours’, the new power can 
only be achieved by the slow withering away of kingly authority, and this is 
the very moment of the birth of the state, and of the very idea of the public. 
 
In the medieval period, as Cassirer has shown,301 a period emerged when the 
distinction between science and alchemy was unclear, and in the same way, 
with regard to the state, two forms of reasoning were in operation and an 
overarching logic remained uncertain and in flux. There is thus no linear 
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process at work, but instead a series of comings and goings, reversals and 
moves forward. The outcome of all these processes is the rise of what 
Bourdieu describes, very significantly, as the ‘meta-field of power’, the 
capacity by the state to determine what counts as capital and what does not, 
to control all the fields of capital. Thus : 
The general thesis on the genesis of the modern state … could be presented 
as follows: you have the progressive constitution of a differentiated space, an 
ensemble of fields – juridical field, administrative field, intellectual field, 
political field … and each of these fields is the site of [specific] struggles … 
These fields are thus in competition with one another, and it was by and large 
in this competition that the state was invented, a kind of ‘meta-field’…302 
This is the most succinct, and at the same time, the most abstract account 
Bourdieu has provided to date of the genesis of the modern state – as the 
arena in which all capitals are decided, the state acting as a sort of referee 
over all the fields of struggle, though clearly not a referee that is capable of 
deciding everything in some autocratic fashion. The rise of this power in the 
wake of the emerging fields of struggle is especially compelling and original. 
 
Bourdieu now turns to a research agenda on the French Revolution, an 
agenda which he would take up if he had more time, and perhaps several 
lifetimes. The analysis would follow Bourdieu’s now-familiar field theory, 
outlining rules, capitals, strategies, struggles and habitus in each field of 
activity. This would, in his view, greatly help in explaining the various 
Republican ideas that emerged at the state’s infancy. But Bourdieu passes up 
this opportunity, and turns instead to some Anglo-Saxon treatments of this 
process – not without an aside about intellectual nationalisms and their 
associated prejudices – and especially to Sarah Hanley’s Lit de Justice of the 
Kings of France.303 Here Bourdieu finds a detailed analysis of the relation 
between the French ‘Parlement’304 and the king. The process of delegation of 
power to the justices – which meant Parlement – is carefully set out. The Lit 
de Justice was a special session of the Parlement during which the king sat 
upon a throne and during which the compulsory registration of royal edicts 
took place. Thus it was the precise moment at which Parlement did not exist 
– the king took this power away simply by being there and usurping 
parliamentary authority. He obliged parliament to submit to him. Hanley’s 
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book details the struggles over this process, a struggle that put at stake, at 
every moment, whether the King’s will would be obeyed, or whether 
parliament would over-rule him. This was clearly a struggle in the balance of 
forces within the political field as this field itself was being constituted. As 
the king faced crises, as in the case of François 1, he sought help from his 
administrators, and thus ceded power to the emerging state.  
 
Bourdieu is clearly excited by Hanley’s book, and particularly by the way in 
which she studies not just the political theories of the time, but the rituals of 
the moment.305 She is thus able to examine the display of authority, of 
hierarchy, of social structure, and, simultaneously, the use of symbolic power 
through the use of a particular discourse, the seating of people on higher and 
lower cushions, the battle for rhetorical profits, and the emergence of a 
juridical structure. Thus juridical struggles become struggles for the symbolic 
power of the state. These were the first attempts to create a public. In these 
struggles, the proponents sought to have the last word, to be present at the 
defining moment. But often these struggles are imperceptible to the outsider : 
Within a field, people fight to the death over things that are imperceptible to 
those who find themselves in the next room.306 
As these battles developed, the field itself changed almost imperceptibly. At 
first, the use of Latin was a key element in the common culture – there had 
to be agreement about a common language with which to fight. As history 
progressed, changes in the use of the language, sometimes infinitesimally 
small changes, also heralded the very slow rise of the public. The jurists made 
increasingly loud claims to be placed on an equal footing with the king, to 
share his power and his authority. ‘The king’s position never dies’ was a 
saying at the time, and this meant that the position of the king, though it be 
filled by different individuals, was never absent – ‘the kingdom was never 
vacant’ was another way to describe the same situation. But if this were so, 
then it meant that the jurists were there to legitimize the king, even as they 
sought to control him. Jurists were thus faced with three contradictions – 
first, they supported law against nature. They were on the side of merit, the 
side of the acquired against the inherited. From the moment they started to 
argue for the rights of the king, they, at one and the same time, tied the king’s 
hands. Second, they were captured by the noble nature of their offices, which 
were inherited, just as the throne was inherited. And third, they were holders 
of a technical competence, the right to exercise a skill over a given territory.  
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Bourdieu is now coming to the end of his lectures, and the argument is 
becoming more intense, and less susceptible to interruptions and asides.307 In 
the next lecture, Bourdieu turns his attention to Keith Baker’s work, Inventing 
the French Revolution.308 History, Bourdieu reminds us, is a stake itself in the 
struggle for understanding. History is always an account of events, not the 
events themselves. History always points to what might have happened, but it 
can never substitute for the ‘real thing’, whatever that means, a point that 
most historians spectacularly overlook.309 And in the present story, the two 
parties engaged in struggle – the king’s party and the state’s party – both 
made use of the discourse of history to further their aims. Jurists during the 
sixteenth century began to constitute a field, and this field of power started to 
establish rules and strategies in which the political struggle took place. Early 
jurists faced a series of contradictions. For one thing, they were holders of 
public office that could be inherited, not unlike the king. On the other hand, 
they turned their face also towards the public, and the establishment of a 
public realm in which shared governance with the king was the ambition. If, 
as Sarah Hanley concludes her book, you seek to pass legislation that 
threatens the jurists’ right of inheritance of office, as was the case in the late 
18th century, then you hit the jurists where it hurts, and resistance is fierce. 
 
In the eighteenth century, writers were supported by the king’s party with 
money, offices and honours, and, as they took up these gifts, they renounced 
their autonomy, and contributed to what Bourdieu calls the royal 
hagiography.310 History again becomes a stake in the political struggle. Louis 
Adrien Le Paige, a bailiff who wrote history, was part of the myth-making 
process surrounding the king. He proposed that the Parlement had always 
existed, or at least through the Middle Ages, an argument that had little basis 
in evidence. This historical reconstruction was established close to the 
moment of the French Revolution. 
 
Baker establishes a typology of jurists of this period. Three forms of authority 
existed at this time, based on the three principles of reason, will and justice.311 
Parlement emphasized justice ; the people focused on the political will of the 
wider community ; the administration spoke the language of reason. As the 
keeper of the archives, Le Paige had a major hand in telling the story of this 
period. He became the ideologist of the parliamentarians, for which he found 
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long-established precedents. Other writers of the period chimed in with their 
own accounts, Malesherbes, for example offering a contemporary account of 
the parliamentary role, thus advocating the juridical argument. Guillaume-
Joseph Saige wrote an account examining the will of the citizenry.312 Thus, 
rather than a single body of ideas, one must understand the rise of the public as 
the rise of a juridical field in which struggles for the last word on history was a 
central capital to be fought over.  
 
Bourdieu now draws himself up to his full height in order to deliver the major 
pronouncement of the day, which is to indicate the contribution of the noblesse 
de robe313 made to the emergence of the state.314 He proposes to leap through 
history in great strides. Explaining the rise of what he calls ‘the berobed’ 
describes also the rise of a new power, and a new basis of power, a power 
founded on ‘… law, education, merit, competence ... capable of opposing 
powers founded on birth’.315 Clerks were at the centre of this enterprise, as they 
wrote, recorded, documented, authenticated, codified and made real the 
ephemeral. They gained control of the law very early on, because they were at 
the centre of the emerging legal discourse. Thus when canon lawyers emerged, 
they were : 
… the inventors of a capital of words and concepts that jurists had at their 
disposal: very often, when it is a question of inventing the social, having the 
word already means making the thing.316 
The state is thus an invention, a construction of the jurists. If words are part 
of the thing they seek to describe, and are significant elements in the 
formation of the real, then elaborating the legal discourse of the state is at the 
centre of state formation. Having the last word means having the power to 
describe, elaborate and form key elements of the new political field. Thus the 
power of words is a real power, the power to name, to bring into being 
elements of the social world that were previously invisible. Jurists are those 
who own a capital of words, concepts, discourses. In archaic societies, it was 
the poet who had the last word, the one person who could say something 
when everyone else had run out of words. Jurists could fall back on an 
immense treasure-house of words. Jurists were able to offer solutions to 
problems, existing problems, certainly, but also problems without precedent. 
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Jurists early on were asked by the king to manage the law. They were 
ennobled to do so. The clerks were connected to the church through canon 
law.317 They made use of the church, and the church provided an early model 
to follow. The rise of a form of ‘civic humanism’ is the rise of this historical 
exchange with the church. The break with the church is a move towards the 
autonomy of the political and the creation of a new political field. The rise of 
the clerks ends with the rise of the public. They are involved with the 
immense work of the codification of the new practices. And understanding 
this may help us understand that ‘this whole history is the history of our 
thinking of this history’.318 
 
Bourdieu now faces his last two lectures at the end of a long series of 
presentations : 
Everything I have said throughout these lectures rests on the idea that ideas 
do things, that ideas make reality, and that the view [of the world], the 
standpoint, the nomos, all those things I have mentioned a hundred times, are 
constructors of reality, to the point that the purest and most abstract battles 
… always have a relationship in the last resort with reality, in both their 
origins and effects, which are extremely powerful.319 
Thus a history of the state given in crudely Marxist-materialist terms will not 
suffice. The genesis of the field of politics and the genesis of the system of 
ideas constitutes the ‘first conclusion of (his) analysis’.320 His second 
conclusion is that : 
… those theories of the state that contribute to the construction of the state, 
and thus to the reality of the state as we know it, are the product of social 
agents located in social space.321 
The jurists, the ‘berobed’, had to make the state prevail. Their interest was in 
creating the public and the universal, and, by this process, they created 
themselves and the offices they hold. 
 
Bourdieu now turns again to the problem of the French Revolution, and he 
gives himself a quarter of an hour to deal with it.322 How much is the 
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Revolution part of a long-term pattern? (the longue durée) For Bourdieu, the 
Revolution was not a rupture, but a stage in the rise of the ‘berobed’, the rise 
of the judicial field, the rise of the public, and by extension, the rise of the 
state. It was associated also with the rise of the meta-capital of the state, a 
power over all other capitals. The state that emerged from the revolution was 
not just a place where economic capital concentrated, but also a storehouse 
of symbolic capital. Thus the debates about the French Revolution as a 
bourgeois revolution are, in Bourdieu’s eyes, false debates. What has been 
damaging has been the rise of widespread analysis of whether such a 
bourgeois revolution has occurred in a large number of other countries – 
Japan and England immediately come to mind. The ethnocentrism of the 
analysis leaves Bourdieu speechless, and, in his view, all the analytical power 
and energy that has been directed towards this problem is wasted.323 In The 
State Nobility324 he argues that the French Revolution did not change anything. 
The rise of the jurists and of juridical capital, and the rise of the state itself, 
enabled the perpetuation of a dominant group to continue. 
 
His fifteen minutes up, and his analysis of the French Revolution complete, 
Bourdieu now turns his attention towards ‘The state and the nation’.325 He 
briefly rehearses his argument about the shift from the dynastic state to the 
juridical state. There arose the notion of a nation, against regions, against 
private interests, against classes, allowing the emergence of the national 
citizen. Thus jurists made the state, which was charged with making the 
nation. Intellectuals, as the bearers of substantial quantities of cultural and 
symbolic capital, are deeply engaged, and are complicit in, the formation of 
the state, and consequently in the construction of the nation. And the 
educational process is one of the fundamental elements of this process. 
 
The state might then be called the ‘centre of a civil religion’.326 The nation 
thus has within it elements of a public imaginary, a national self-
representation, and this is embedded, and manifested in, a common history, a 
common language, familiar landscapes and territory, a love of country. Thus 
jurists constructed the state, and they created the pre-conditions for the 
development of a nation. In the case of France, Bourdieu argues that the state 
made the nation, and all those who spoke French were part of that nation. But 
for him, the German case was quite different – here the nation made the state, and 
all German speakers were members of the nation. In France the state came 
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first. In Germany the nation came first and created the state. Thus there is an 
English history of the state, a German history and a French history, and there 
are logics that are common to all these histories, as well as major contrasts, 
especially in the philosophies that gave rise to these states.  
 
We finally confront his last lecture on the state, the meeting of 12 December, 
1991. Here he plans to bring the argument up to date. He reiterates his earlier 
account of the simultaneous birth of the juridical state, and the birth of the 
citizen and the nation. What’s missing thus far is the story of the rise of the 
parliament. For Bourdieu what characterises the parliament particularly is the 
rise of an apparently organised consensus which hides the reality of a 
‘regulated dissension’.327 This mystification is a precondition for the political 
system to work. It thus limits the modes of dissension and excludes those not 
playing a part in legitimate political life. 
 
Parliament is the theatre in which dissent is displayed, acted out, directed, 
regulated and managed. But the movement ‘from the paper state to the real 
state’328 required several generations of steady work. The welfare state is 
central to this process, making material some of the promises established in 
the paper state. This process creates the conditions under which ‘the people’ 
might be enticed to play the game. Given that they have something of a 
developing stake in the state, they will be gradually more willing to acquiesce 
to its will. Thus the welfare state emerges. The question then becomes – how 
to manage social affairs. The work the state is engaged in is to ‘domesticate 
the dominated’.329 Weber imagined that the work of the state, in part, was 
involved in trapping the dangerous classes through the relief of fundamental 
problems involving the usual welfarist litany – health, education, economic 
security (to some degree), pensions and the like. This stratagem thus involves 
integrating the dominated, who are invited to ‘join the game’.330 Still, in the 
national unconscious, and especially in the rhetoric of the right, the notion of 
the ‘dangerous classes’ is vividly alive. One of the major roles of the school in 
the 19th century was to reduce this danger, and one way to do it was to focus 
on common issues that affected all classes, such as cholera and other national 
problems. The dominated can choose to exit the system, but there are 
genuine material costs involved in exiting. The dominated are thus forced, in 
a sense, to make concessions in order to be included in the universe of 
citizenry. 
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In recent years, the rise of a 19th century theory of personal blame had made 
a re-appearance. ‘The poor are poor because they don’t work hard enough’ is 
typical of this genre of thinking, and leads to completely new theories of the 
state. The rise of the state in its early forms was associated with the 
socialization of risk. In Bourdieu’s view, social scientists were complicit in the 
rise of the state, in the kinds of ideas that gave rise to the state. The rise of 
the state depended on a cultural revolution. 
 
Bourdieu now comes to a final set of conclusions.331 Why was this long 
digression into history necessary, he first asks. It was to try to free ourselves 
from the ‘state within us’, that mode of thinking directed by the state, shaped 
by the state, and originating in the state, that forces us to think of the state in 
a certain way. He calls this form of amnesia the ‘amnesia of genesis’, that 
amnesia that arises from forgetting the social origins of our thought. In order 
to combat this dilemma, Bourdieu has proposed genetic thinking, going to 
the source of the system of ideas. We must bring those things that seem 
natural out of the shadows and make them visible again. At the heart of the 
issue, as with the rise of the state, is the challenge to pre-existing mental 
structures. Symbolic revolutions are always violent revolutions : 
 
… if wars of succession are among the most violent of wars – think of 
Yugoslavia, for example – this is undoubtedly because they challenge mental 
structures. 
There is always a symbolic dimension in revolutions. Symbolic 
revolutions include, for example, the great religious revolutions. May 68 was 
[perhaps] a false revolution, but it was perceived as a true revolution and is 
still producing effects, since it affected the mental structures of the whole 
academic body across the whole world. Symbolic revolutions unleash terrible 
violence because they attack the integrity of minds, they attack people in what 
is most essential for them, it’s a question of life and death.332 
 
What conclusions can we then draw from the genetic history of the state? 
First, that the bureaucratic field embodies the meta-power, the power of all 
powers, the control of all fields. In the present setting in France, the social 
ministries are the locations where the spending largely takes place, and 
around these spendings struggles occur, both within and without the state. 
The left hand state, the state of social spending, is continually under threat 
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from the right hand state, the financial and commercial ministries.333 Indeed, 
for the last 20 years according to Bourdieu, the work of the last 200 years has 
been deconstructed.334 There is thus a crisis in morality, in the collective 
wisdom, in the philosophy of collective responsibility. There is a loss in the 
belief in public service. There is a loss in the belief that the state can do some 
good. As a result, there is an increase in day-to-day suffering, and a turning 
away from the state, since it no longer provides for ordinary people. 
Bourdieu then draws a startling conclusion : 
Do not all these phenomena that are described to us in a prophetic mode 
have some connection with the dissolution of those things that that were 
progressively built up? Isn’t this a kind of despair about the state, a kind of 
despair … (that leads to) … the attitudes of those who, not participating in 
the state, no longer have any temporal recourse and so retreat into the 
spiritual, into a form of reverie? Isn’t the ‘return of religion’, in actual fact, a 
retreat from the state?335 
It is no surprise that Bourdieu ends his lectures with a question. A sustaining 
theme throughout these lectures has been how much remains to be 
explained, and he went on, in the following years until his death in 2002, to 
speak of the politics of social suffering in a wide range of media. These 
lectures were thus hardly his last word on politics or the state. But two 
further powerful conclusions can immediately be drawn. Bourdieu has now 
implicitly pointed to the achievements of this state that he has lovingly traced 
from the Middle Ages, and thrown his hat in with those who defend its 
accomplishments on behalf of the dominated classes. He has also prophesied 
much of what was to come in attacks on the French state, and particularly the 
rise of Islamic militancy, right in the heart of the Republic in Paris, among 
Islamic youngsters, turning away from the state and towards religious sources 
of inspiration.336 
                                                     
333 This is the first time that Bourdieu has introduced this terminology, though it was 
widely used in his later work.  For a simple way into this reasoning, see the interview 
Bourdieu gave to R.P. Droit and T. Ferenczi in 1992 in the journal Variant, issue 32. 
This can be accessed at http://www.variant.org.uk/32texts/bourdieu32.html.  
(Recovered March 29, 2017.) 
334 Ibid., page 369. 
335 Ibid., pages 369-370. 
336 This was not the end of Bourdieu’s political writings, and indeed, in the last ten 
years of his life, ending with his death in 2002, he spent enormous amounts of 
intellectual and physical energy mobilizing academics and others against neoliberalism.  
See especially the journal Liber, which he launched in 1989, the foundation of Raison 
D’Agir, a collective of workers, activists, intellectuals, journalists, with branches 
throughout Europe, which also published short topical books on political subjects, 
and many published works.  He wrote On Television (New Press, 1999, New York) an 
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I plan now to summarise, in a series of brief points, the main elements of 
Bourdieu’s exposition of his theory of the state. 
 
1. As one reads the lectures, it is impossible to ignore the social milieu, the 
setting at the Collège, the wide variety of people in the audience, the many 
questions he tried to answer, the TV programs and contemporary events he 
sought to understand and explain, even as he propagated this theory of the 
state. This is no intellectual mandarin speaking to the masses from on high, 
with perfectly curated notes before him, the air of the state’s authority 
surrounding him like a halo. Instead, Bourdieu’s argument wanders all over 
the place, meandering into multiple asides, dawdling down cul-de-sacs, and is 
finally turned back to the main road of his argument by moments of 
brilliance. We are rescued from this constant threat of chaos by occasional 
glimpses of revelation and insight. There is certainly a logic and a pathway to 
follow, but it is a pathway that only the most durable follower is likely to 
trace to the end. Bourdieu’s is a theory of pessimism. It is about domination, 
pure and simple, (yet nothing here is simple) and not about class or the 
popular masses. He develops a magnificent and elaborate theory of the state, 
its formation and its purposes. And this argument has centred on the 
symbolic world, the role of ideas and theories with relation to the state. In 
1986, in an interview he had commented about a report he had written for 
the government on education, and was asked whether the report would 
influence policy : 
I think my optimism is that there is some little power of ideas. Before I held 
the conviction that said ‘don’t believe it, don’t believe in the power of ideas’. 
But now, I say that under some structural and political conditions, there is 
some power to ideas. So, we must use it. If not the power structure is so 
terrible, so complete.337 
In these lectures, he is willing to take a much stronger stand on the question 
of whether ideas matter: 
Everything I have said throughout these lectures rests on the idea that ideas 
do things, that ideas make reality, and that the view [of the world], the 
standpoint, the nomos, all those things I have mentioned a hundred times, are 
constructors of reality, to the point that the purest and most abstract battles 
                                                                                                              
attack on the sycophantism of TV journalists ; The Weight of the World ; social suffering in 
contemporary society (Polity, Cambridge, 1993), a 1,000 page treatise that sold 100,000 
copies upon its release, and which the conservative French cabinet were ordered to 
read by Prime Minister Balladur ; and Acts of Resistance ; Against the Tyranny of the 
Market. (Cambridge, 1998, Polity), among many other political interventions. 
337 Harker et al., op. cit., pages 54-55. 
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… always have a relationship in the last resort with reality, in both their 
origins and effects, which are extremely powerful.338 
2. There are many deficiencies in his argument, but for the sake of brevity, I 
will mention only two. There is the unambiguous sense that Bourdieu affords 
the state a will and volition that is hard to justify. For Bourdieu, the state is 
an actor, with a will, a logic and its own forms of motivation.339 But more 
than this, a second claim of incompleteness seems obvious. While the rise of 
the juridical state, with its symbolic violence added to physical violence, is 
brilliantly portrayed, there is a complete neglect of other fundamental aspects 
of state genesis, and especially economic factors, which for reasons that 
might well be closely tied to his resistance to committing Marxist inanities, 
are almost completely absent. It is a telling silence. 
 
3. Adding symbolic violence to physical violence in Weber’s famous account 
of the state as a ‘ … community that claims the monopoly of the legitimate 
use of physical force within a given territory’340 upturns decades of thinking 
about the state as the last resort of physical violence in order to ensure order. 
It is a brave and innovative step forward in accounting for state formation, 
and especially when Bourdieu clearly gives primacy to the symbolic, and 
insists on the penetration of the symbolic into the heart of the material. And 
his extraordinary writing on the move from the dynastic state to the juridical 
state, the elaboration of the centuries-long processes of codification, 
classification, the concentration of capitals, the naming, the authorizing and 
the hierarchizing of the social, is massively impressive. 
 
4. This rise of the juridical state Bourdieu interprets as a form of ‘magic’, a 
magic which he describes in two ways. Using Marcel Mauss as his inspiration, 
he argues that the state gains its magic because the audience, in this case the 
citizenry, allow that such a magic just might exist, believe in the possibility 
that something wonderful just possibly could occur, that justice will break 
out, that economic security might prevail, that the old systems of exploitation 
and domination will dissolve. Thus with the rise of the kingly seal, the 
documents that are passed down from on high have a magical quality to 
them, dispensing hope and possibilities to those in the lower orders. But in a 
second way, the state gains a magic by becoming the storehouse of all 
capitals, the focus especially of symbolic capital, and more than any of this, 
becomes the place where the value of these capitals is decided, and where 
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340 Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, 1918. 
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control of all the social fields resides. This ‘meta-capital’ is where the magical 
power of the state comes to rest. Thus : 
The state is the culmination of a process of concentration of different species 
of capital: capital of physical force or instruments of coercion (army, police), 
economic capital, cultural or (better) informational capital, and symbolic 
capital. It is this concentration as such which constitutes the state as the 
holder of a sort of meta-capital granting power over other species of capital 
and over their holders.341 
5. The state is ‘within us’, claims Bourdieu, and to escape this mental prison-
house, we must implicate Bourdieu’s genetic structuralism to set ourselves 
free, in order to enable us to examine the whole matter anew. Symbolic 
transformations, such as the rise of the state, are so violent and so painful 
because they attack our mental structures, and alter the way we view the 
world. The state has become so much part of us that we can see it no longer. 
It has become invisible. To save us from perpetual blindness, Bourdieu 
proposes a new method to us for opening our eyes. 
 
6. The world of the state that Bourdieu reveals, this universalising, this 
dominating, this all-encompassing world of hierarchy, privilege and relentless 
power seems to be the last place to seek utopia. Yet Bourdieu clearly sees in 
the rise of the modern state a field in which the forlorn hopes for liberty, 
fraternity and equality might still be kept alive. If there is any doubt about 
this, remember his vigorous campaign on behalf of the welfare state.342 And 
Bourdieu provides also the mental apparatus by which we might seek a 
greater freedom : 
The ultimate purpose of Bourdieu’s sociology, then, is nothing other than to 
foster the blossoming of a new, self-critical, Aufklärung (enlightenment) fit 
for the new millennium. By directing us to probe the foundations of 
knowledge, the structures of social being, and the hidden possibilities of 
history, it offers us instruments of individual and collective self-appropriation 
and thus of wisdom – it helps us pursue, as it were, the originary mission of 
philosophy.343 
  
                                                     
341 P. Bourdieu, Rethinking the state: genesis and structure of the bureaucratic field, in 
Sociological Theory, 12 (1/1994), page 4. 
342 See also, among many other sources, an explicit defence of the welfare state in the 
interview Bourdieu gave to R.P. Droit and T. Ferenczi in 1992 in the journal Variant, 
op. cit. 
343 Löic Wacquant, ‘Pierre Bourdieu’, in Rob Stones (ed.) Key Sociological Thinkers, 
second edition, page 276, op. cit. 
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4. A Future in Search of a Theory 
We began this journey through the theoretical landscape of the state in the 
company of Antonio Gramsci, who took the unusual path of explaining why, 
even in the face of fascism, and the rise of the totalitarian state, there could 
be spaces, ways of avoiding oppression, methods of living separately from 
the state, that allowed a future to be lived out beyond fascist understandings 
of the future.344 Since the rise of the industrial order, and certainly since Marx 
and beyond, social theorists of the left have struggled to explain the 
persistence of capitalism, a system designed to produce inequality. They have 
sought to explain how the state, in its various forms, has managed to sustain 
an economic system riddled with crisis, competition and uncertainty, which 
otherwise, according to their view, would have collapsed as Marx had 
predicted that it would. And beyond the inevitable inequality that this system 
produced, they have also tried to understand how the state might be used to 
further a more equal world. In these forms of theory, from Gramsci’s 
complicated arguments that showed the state is not just a violent instrument, 
even under fascism, to Poulantzas’s arguments that even in Greece, Portugal 
and Spain, more recent authoritarian régimes, there are sources of hope, to 
the uprisings of May 68, which offered the prospect of revolution in the most 
advanced capitalist societies of the West, these imaginings of utopia were 
kept alive. 
 
Were these utopian ambitions always doomed to disappointment? No simple 
answer can be provided, obviously enough. The Russian Revolution, which 
many on the left came to understand provided a false hope, and which 
tarnished socialism with the permanent burden of totalitarianism, was also 
profoundly important in offering a counter-weight to capitalism, as 
Poulantzas has shown in detail. His systematic retelling of the influence of 
Russian theoretical work on western theories of the state is salutary. But any 
hopes that still lingered for a Soviet-style revolution in the West were washed 
away by the gradual understanding of the reality of daily life under ‘actually 
existing socialism’, the life-world of those living in Czechoslovakia, Hungary 
and the other Soviet satellites after World War Two. The brutal crushing of 
dissidents in Hungary in 1956, followed by the Prague Spring of 1968, in 
which Hungarian moves towards liberalism were squashed by the invasion of 
500,000 Warsaw Pact troops, led to a burning of Communist Party 
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membership cards throughout Western Europe, and a widespread 
disenchantment with the entire Soviet-inspired enterprise.345 
 
But while a revolutionary shift to a Soviet-style society might have been 
swept aside, much hope from the left was still placed in the rise of the 
welfare state. In the U.K. in the 1950’s and 1960’s the rise of ‘Croslandism’, 
that theory of the state that argued that, with appropriate compromises, the 
working class could get what they needed through a social-democratic form 
of collaboration, provided a signal moment in western politics. Compromise 
was never enough among the Eurocommunists, and they were not to be 
mollified because the health system had got a little better. They wanted a 
change in the mode of production. But in Britain in the 1950s, some major 
industries had, in fact, been socialised, the new national health system was up 
and running, and an elaborate system of pensions was now in place. It 
seemed to many that the basic work of social improvement was over. The 
Fordist utopia of the post-war period – a fridge in every kitchen, a chicken in 
every pot, and a car in every driveway – had been achieved for many, even 
while private enterprise had steadily been flourishing.  
 
The ‘false revolution’ of May 68 provided further fuel for the revolutionary 
fire. The partial achievements of the welfare state might be able to be 
completed through revolutionary means. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s’ 
social theorists of the left continued to write about advanced capitalism and 
the political possibilities for transformation. Much of the writing, as Bourdieu 
has sharply pointed out, took the form of Marxist functionalism, doing no 
more than explaining how the state served to provide the social architecture 
of capitalist reproduction. But while radical movements were having some 
success, if not in Western Europe, then in Latin America and elsewhere, a 
politics of revolution and of social change was always closely connected to a 
theory of the state. 
 
These reversals and advances were brought to a halt by the Thatcher-Reagan 
shift to the right. On the back of a world-wide fiscal crisis of the state, which 
brought the Fordist era to an end, the promise of the welfare state also came 
to be widely discounted. The state, rather than withering away, had become 
kidnapped by the private economy in a form of corporatism that meant the 
private sector flourished, and the dispossessed were gently and quietly 
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disenfranchised. As many have said, the great achievement of Thatcherism 
was Blairism, the belief that compromise with capitalism and market forces 
was the only possible utopia, the only way forward, the only theory of the left 
still standing, the only hope for progressive forces in the emerging ‘late-late 
capitalism’. Stuart Hall perfectly captured the ‘cultural turn’ of this period, 
during which the common sense was corralled by rightist politicians who 
understood, much quicker than most theorists of the state, that the cultural 
and symbolic territory was the most important territory to capture. Branding, 
marketing and the domination of systems of communication became the 
battleground that Blair and his acolytes understood so well, and their success 
in this field propelled them forward through several elections. Bourdieu 
could have predicted this shift, but few on the left were still listening.  
5. Brief Skirmishes with the Future 
While there may be no new theory of the state carrying all before it at the 
time of writing, there are many younger writers doing battle to explain parts 
of the most recent phases of capitalism. Here I briefly mention three – Jules 
Boykoff, Naomi Klein and George Monbiot.346  
 
In a series of recent books, articles and interviews347, the political theorist 
Jules Boykoff examines the particular form that capitalism takes around one 
of the major global sporting events – the Olympics. Labelling this 
phenomenon ‘Celebration Capitalism’, Boykoff claims that a new era in 
capitalism has been reached in the guise of ‘capitalism at play’348, and that the 
                                                     
346 There are many more examples.  See, for example, Political Sociology: oppression, 
resistance and the state, Davita Sylfen Glasberg and Deric Shannon, (Pine Forge 
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theories of the state, and the importance of multiple oppressions theory to any 
adequate account of the state.  On multiple oppressions theory itself, see Amy L. 
Reynolds and Raechelle L. Pope, ‘The Complexities of Diversity: exploring multiple 
oppressions’, in Journal of Counselling and Development, September/October 1991, 
volume 70 ; and Pilgrimages, Peregrinajes: theorizing coalition against multiple oppressions,  
María Lugones, Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, 2003. On privilege theory, see 
‘What’s wrong with privilege theory’, Esme Choonara and Yuri Prasad, in International 
Socialism, issue 142, posted April 2, 2014.  In the cause of complete disclosure, I was a 
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347 For further details, see http://julesboykoff.org.  This is a very partial and 
incomplete account of a very detailed and impressive body of work. 
348 Page 155 in Power Games: a political history of the Olympics, Verso, London and New 
York, 2016.  But see also the earlier Celebration Capitalism and the Olympic Games, 
Routledge, London, 2014, which first propagates this notion in full form.  In the 
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vast operations of the Olympic movement, with its considerable state 
investment in infrastructure from the host countries, and widespread private 
investment from commercial sponsors, represent a new phase in capitalist 
evolution : 
In this century, the Olympics have taken the form of what I call “celebration 
capitalism”, a political-economic formation marked by lopsided public-
private partnerships that favor private enterprise while dumping risk on the 
taxpayer. The normal rules … are temporarily suspended in the name of a 
media-trumpeted, hyper-commercial spectacle, all safeguarded by beefed-up 
security forces responsible for preventing terrorism, corralling political 
dissent, and protecting the festivities. Celebration capitalism is an upbeat 
shakedown, trickle-up economics with wrenching human costs.349 
Boykoff provides an impressive and exhaustive critical history of the 
Olympics until, and including, the recent events in Brazil during 2016. For 
him, celebration capitalism is not the neoliberalism of the past, but a rather 
new phenomenon. It invokes a notion that the market has become the 
common sense of the day, but, for him, the Olympics are not merely the 
latest site on which the neoliberal agenda plays out. For Boykoff, this is 
something different – an unhealthy re-alliance between the state and the 
private sector reminiscent of an earlier regulationist period of capitalist 
development. Celebration capitalism exists ‘in (a) state of exception’,350 in 
which the normal rules of government and ordered activity are thrown out 
the window, and unusual and irregular events are allowed to occur. Indeed, it 
may be the case that the very distinction between public and private 
dissolves. Often the state and the ‘authorities’ can give political coverage and 
legitimacy to what turns out to be simply another massive opportunity for 
private profit. The relationship between the public and the private sector is 
thus wholly unequal, with the private sector rapidly outstripping the state’s 
capacity to control it. In the end, the many promises of public benefits, such 
as new housing, new sporting arenas, and the many other social 
improvements that are listed in the ‘bid documents’ turn out to be empty 
                                                                                                              
become a massive planned economy designed to shield the rich from risk while 
providing them with a spectacle to treasure.  Placing political economy at the center 
of the analysis, and drawing on interdisciplinary research in sociology, politics, 
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“celebration capitalism”, the manipulation of state actors as partners that drives us 
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arguments propagated for the sole purpose of gaining the support of the 
Olympic committee members. Careful analysis of sixteen games clearly 
indicates a negative impact on income for those countries involved.351 A final 
outcome is that the public arena must manage any debts that remain once the 
crowds have left, after the private market shifts the profits elsewhere. All this 
takes place under the management of a vast security apparatus run by private 
security companies, who ensure social order is maintained against any 
possible protests or resistances, the monopoly of the legitimate use of 
coercion now transferred from the public to the private arena.  
 
Boykoff documents with care the recent events in Greece, London and in 
Brazil to show how these elements of celebration capitalism work themselves 
out in practice. He is also at pains to suggest what might happen in the 
future. Anti-Olympic resistance workers have been active for many years at 
all the Games gatherings, though usually marginalized to the edge of the 
action by both public and private security forces. The announcement of 
Brazil’s success in attracting the Games to Rio was greeted by the country as 
a chance to show the world that Brazil was moving into the first echelon of 
advanced societies, so that the hyperbole associating nationalism with the 
Games was clearly alive and well. But it was also true that private developers 
and commercial interests were lined up to reap huge profits from this most 
recent reincarnation of celebration capitalism. How this juggernaut can be 
successfully resisted in the future remains the over-arching political question. 
Demolishing entire neighbourhoods, including housing when necessary, 
coupled with the routine repression of dissidents, seems to have been part of 
all these recent events, and things were to be no different in Brazil. In Brazil’s 
case, a major concern was to quell dissent among the favelas, and so a police 
chief was involved in the bid to assure the decision-makers that all would be 
secure.352 The problem of possible terrorist attacks was often used as 
ideological coverage for the massive police and security presence in recent 
Games. 
 
Boykoff cites several possible sources of resistance. Clearly the entire 
privatization and commercialization of what was once supposed to be an 
amateur undertaking, symbolizing visions of justice, equity and fair play, has 
been hopelessly compromised and alienated from its origins. Whether this 
shameful degradation of plausible values still carries any political weight is 
                                                     
351 Ibid., page 161.  Boykoff is citing Andrew Zimbalist’s Circus maximus, page 38, in 
Zimbalist, Andrew S. Circus maximus: the economic gamble behind hosting the Olympics and the 
World Cup, Brookings, 2015, Washington. 
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unclear. There ought to come a point when the slight difference between 
high moral principles and actual practices turns into such a large chasm that 
even the most greed-ridden intelligence is confronted with the gap, but this 
seems not to be the case. If high principle will not shift the direction of the 
Games, what will? Clearly local communities can fight back, and sometimes 
do so successfully.353 Recent versions of the games have played lip-service to 
Green values, though they have often proved to be empty commitments.354 
Boykoff also looks into the future to see where the Games are headed now. 
As the guest at a Franz Beckenbauer event,355 Boykoff was able to present an 
alternative view to representatives of the IOC, and was encouraged to see 
that many at the highest levels of organization were aware of the crisis at 
hand, and determined to see a change. For Boykoff, they will change because 
their economic self-interest is at stake ; their brands are under threat.356 While 
such people remain indifferent to the needs of ordinary people, they may do 
very little, simply changing the image people have of the Olympics, rather 
than making any real alterations – an updated version of shifting the furniture 
on the deck of the Titanic. In December 2014, the same potentates ‘huddled 
in Monaco’ to create reforms for the 2020 Olympics, an agenda that was 
passed unanimously.357 The press unanimously confirmed that a revolution 
had occurred, but clearly the devil will be in the details, and especially in the 
matter of whether any promises will be kept in measurable terms. Several 
countries have now dropped out of the race to host the Games in the future, 
often because of financial concerns. None of the Agenda 2020 proposals 
involve accountability. Owen Gibson from the Guardian newspaper argues 
that the agreement is ‘the shallow, platitudinous soup of what passes for 
international sporting diplomacy’.358 
 
Instead of empty words, Boykoff calls for genuine reform, starting with 
facing the actual costs of running the Games,359 including the costs to the 
local populations affected by the plans for the Games We need also to face 
the conflicts of interest that abound around such people as the auditors, who 
also turn out to be sponsors. The Games have embraced ‘Greenness’ as a 
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359 Ibid., pages 241-252. 
Utopias 
 
85 
theme of the Games, but little has actually happened. The Games should 
democratize the political structures around the Olympics, lowering the 
gender and class barriers to membership of the IOC, for example. There 
needs also to be transparency, especially covering the reimbursement of IOC 
members. Gender bias has long been an obstacle to equality among the IOC, 
and it still remains a barrier. And finally, the IOC needs to go back to the 
lofty principles of the founders of the Games – human rights, dignity, equity 
and a lack of commercial involvement. Boykoff sees in these values much to 
be encouraged. He is simply urging IOC members to live up to their own 
charter. Activism has, in his view, already shone a critical light on the Games, 
and this must be beneficial. In Boston, Boykoff points to the success of 
activists preventing a bid going through in January 2015.360 A plan for 
preventing the games coming to a city near you seems to be emerging. 
Boykoff concludes : 
Despite the IOC’s vise-like grip on power, despite the privilege threaded 
through the history of the Games, despite the multifarious ways everyday 
people in Olympic city after Olympic city have been marginalized and 
manipulated, the struggle continues. In some ways, activists and Games 
critics of today are empowered like never before. Momentum has shifted. 
“Hegemony,” as the great Stuart Hall reminds us, “is never for forever”. 
Three cheers for that.361 
Boykoff sums up his argument in the following way : 
Capitalism is a nimble shapeshifter, and that sometimes takes the form of 
neoliberalism replete with privatisation, deregulation, financialization, and 
‘letting the markets decide’. But in reality there are many ‘actually existing 
capitalisms’ that can be evolving at the same time. … This is consistent with 
David Harvey’s insight that neoliberalism and capitalism more generally ‘is an 
unstable and evolving regime of accumulation …’362 
Boykoff’s account is a highly original, well-documented and creative way to 
assess a large component of capitalist culture – much of what he says has 
applicability to a wide range of social and cultural phenomena. Football’s 
four-yearly World Cup, not to mention the English Premier League, and the 
vast empires of American sport - the NFL, Major League Baseball and the 
various professional basketball leagues come immediately to mind. It is thus a 
most useful addition to the growing literature on the present moves that 
capitalism is making. It also seeks, as Bourdieu had hoped sociology and 
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critical thinking might do, to uncover, reveal and expose what it often sold as 
a common sense, a taken-for-granted discourse about the world that hides a 
structure of domination and exploitation. Boykoff thus carries on the 
classical tradition of sociological exposure and truth-telling that Bourdieu 
calls on us to continue into the future. Boykoff’s is not a theory of capitalism 
in general, but an account of a particular strand of capitalist development. 
Nor does Boykoff continue the theorizing of the state in the fullest sense, 
though he does point out the regulationist basis that characterises the 
political economy of celebration capitalism. And, most impressively, he does 
provide us with a detailed account of the politics of resistance to the new 
capitalist directions. 
 
In a discussion of Naomi Klein’ s work, Boykoff comments : 
Celebration capitalism is disaster capitalism’s affable cousin. It thrives on 
social euphoria, not collective shock.363  
There is a much darker side to recent patterns of exploitation, and the 
Canadian journalist and author Naomi Klein has been exposing some of this 
activity through what she has termed ‘disaster capitalism’ for some years 
now.364 In The Shock Doctrine, Klein traces the origins of a form of capitalist 
adventurism that arises around human and social disasters. In the aftermath 
of major catastrophes – earthquakes, tsunamis, tornados, coup d’états and 
terrorist acts – populations are so traumatized that the normal rules of 
human behaviour are suspended, and this moment of social chaos provides 
an opportunity for the free markets to dive in and offer instant solutions. In 
the case of New Orleans, for example, in the wake of Hurricane Katrina in 
2005, right-wing activists, supported by funding from foundations and the 
Republican government of George W. Bush, ran into the wreckage, offering 
school vouchers to parents whose children no longer had schools. Proposing 
for-profit alternatives backed by the government’s funds, they sought to take 
over the traditional publically-funded school system in order to gain 
ideological and economic control of the school system, a move that met with 
stiff resistance from African-American parents, who found in the existence 
of the public school system a mechanism for sustaining civil rights gains 
from the past. This is one of many examples that Klein brings to bear from 
all over the world, from the privatization of prisons in Britain and the U.S., 
                                                     
363 Ibid., page 159. 
364 See especially This Changes Everything : Capitalism vs. the Climate, London, Penguin, 
2015.  Klein, Naomi.  See also The Shock Doctrine: the Rise of Disaster Capitalism. New 
York: Metropolitan Books/Henry Holt ; and Klein, Naomi. 2009, No logo: taking aim at 
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to case studies from Pakistan, Papua New Guinea and Iraq. Fuelled by 
neoliberal ideas stemming from Friedman and the Chicago School, Klein 
proposes that the free market strategy is to seize on weak partners, and to 
exploit human misery whenever the possibility exists, whether it be in the 
‘newly liberated’ Poland after the end of Communism, or Iraq after the U.S.-
led invasion. ‘Catastrophe Capitalism’ enjoys the anarchy that derives from 
social disorder, seeing it as an opportunity to create a new structure based on 
free market principles. The fact that such initiatives create massive reaction, 
resistance and bitter opposition, often leading to further disasters, seems not 
to register in the minds of the protagonists of the new order. In ‘Disaster 
Capitalism’, Klein sees the rise of a global economic system that often 
requires terror, and certainly social catastrophe, to do its work. She sees, for 
example the ‘inner harmony’365 between the violence of the Pinochet régime 
and the free market policies that followed. If the shock of the revolution was 
not enough, and if the free market policies didn’t hold people’s attention, 
then a third shock from the military and the police was always available to be 
used. 
 
In its wake, it is hard to see what can be done by the progressive forces of 
the left, and nor is there an elaborated theory of the state developed here that 
could be used to explain what might be possible through government action. 
Instead, while the arguments about the rise of this new form of capitalism are 
immensely persuasive, brilliantly argued and thoroughly convincing, there is 
little in the way of a counter-weight to suggest what strategies might be 
successful. In a review of The Shock Doctrine, Stiglitz comments :  
Klein ends on a hopeful note, describing nongovernmental organizations and 
activists around the world who are trying to make a difference. After 500 
pages of “The Shock Doctrine,” it’s clear they have their work cut out for 
them.366 
Given Klein’s role as a journalist is to document the truth as she sees it, and 
not provide elaborate theories of the state for progressive academics to 
consider, the vision she has of the state must be inferred from what is absent 
from the account. In the case of Iraq, for example, she sees a dystopia in the 
wreckage of the war, but also a site at which Haliburton still does business 
and still makes money. The state is in ruins, everyday life a matter of survival, 
and the free market survives. And yet, it is hard to argue that the free 
marketeers saw anything more in these conditions than the chance to make a 
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profit. The conditions in these settings have often been anarchic, chaotic and 
without logic, and certainly not a result of the logic of the state. Putin’s state-
capitalism is hardly anarchy, but it is hardly a free market. It certainly has a 
logic to it. And the problem with Iraq in the aftermath of the war, from the 
perspective of the United States, was that the lack of a bureaucratic structure, 
the lack of a functioning state, meant that the supply of oil was threatened.367 
The point is that a free-market utopia does not always result from disaster, 
where the outcomes are often uncertain, where states may rise and fall, and 
free market initiatives are commonly incomplete. 
 
Thus it might be reasonable to conclude that Klein’s work as an anti-
capitalist global climate change activist has opened our collective eyes to the 
tragedies occurring around us, and more than this, that she has connected a 
series of disparate case studies into a general logic connecting these various 
examples, to the rise of a single cause – neoliberalism. When she does invoke 
a theory of the state, one might draw the conclusion that this is an 
instrumentalist theory – the state in the hands of the neoliberals. Like 
Boykoff, she has contributed massively to our understanding of a major slice 
of ‘late-late capitalism’. It remains for the rest of us to propose arguments 
that might explain the role of the state and other public institutions in 
defending the public good against the jackals of private profit. The need for 
further research that indicates, on a case by case basis, how the state reacts in 
the wake of these crises, is part of the agenda that Bourdieu and others have 
proposed. 
 
On March 16th., 2017, while searching for a contemporary author to examine 
who was writing about the most recent stages of capitalism, an email from 
the familiar leftist publisher Verso dropped into my email inbox. The 
announcement, as if from some leftist heaven, presented by chance the latest 
incarnation of a critique of neoliberalism in the form of a new book from 
George Monbiot.368 In How Did we Get into this Mess, Monbiot reports on the 
                                                     
367 See, for example, John Gray, The Guardian, September 15th, 2007.  
368 Monbiot is, according to his own website, an English-born, Oxford educated, 
investigative journalist mostly focused on environmental issues, but with a wider remit 
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worst excesses of ‘late-late capitalism’. His attack on neoliberalism centres on 
the enormously undemocratic nature of the structures that surround the 
economic inequality that it brings – the lack of regulation surrounding the 
economic system, the capacity of the rich to avoid paying their taxes, for 
companies to get away with polluting without penalty, for industry to avoid 
paying fair wages. We have arrived, he proposes, at democracy for the rich, 
and exploitation for the poor. The rich are beyond the law ; the poor are 
oppressed by it. He notes Frederick Hayek’s call for democracy to be put to 
one side in the service of free market capitalism, because he saw it as an 
impediment. Neoliberalism, in Monbiot’s view, has been enormously 
successful on a global scale, leading to the privatization of the state, to 
corporations too big to fail, and to widespread deregulation, amid calls to 
reduce state activity. But in the Bush-era collapse of AIG and other major 
private corporations in the United States, he sees ‘an intense irony’ in the fact 
that it was the deep involvement of the state that was required to rescue 
many large private institutions that could not survive without massive state 
intervention. Thus : 
There is a profound irony here, in that neoliberalism was supposed to get the 
state to get out of the way, but it requires intense state involvement in order 
to function.369 
None of this account will be news to those who have been reading this 
present examination of state theory, or who are politically alert on the left. 
Monbiot’s retelling of the neoliberal catastrophe had been told before many 
times. Some of his investigative research has been path-breaking and 
inventive, adding new richness to the reportage we already have. But one is 
forced to argue that, with the best intentions in the world, this is a saturated 
theory in the ‘grounded theory’ sense of that term. The case has already been 
made, and made many times. Reading Poulantzas, Bourdieu, Wright, Boykoff 
and Klein is to read from the same songbook – they are all telling the same 
tale of neoliberalist desecrations. The case has now been profoundly and 
seriously made in a series of settings, and it is hard to see what further 
investigations will bring, except, perhaps, to keep us up to date with the latest 
                                                                                                              
Heat: How to Stop the Planet Burning (September 2006, Allen Lane); U.S. edition (April 
2007, South End Press) ; The Age of Consent (2003, Flamingo) ; and Captive State: The 
Corporate Takeover of Britain (2000, Macmillan).  
369 This quotation comes from a YouTube video made by George Monbiot, recovered 
from 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UuMntvVwwWM&feature=youtu.be&utm_sou
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+Monbiot+Neoliberalism&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_1f96ba5fab-
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horrors that neoliberalism is visiting upon us, certainly no small task, and 
probably a valuable one. What is implicit here in Monbiot’s account is that 
the state’s more complex role of the past in representing a general interest, in 
whatever diminished and incomplete form it may have happened, is now at 
an end, and the state has fallen back into instrumentalism, becoming a simple 
weapon of capital. All that is left is a state that sustains and supports capitalist 
interests. All other interests, whether class, gender, or ethnically-based, have 
been relegated to the outer regions of the political order. 
 
For Monbiot, Trump and Brexit are the latest call for freedom for the 
billionaires.370 They want freedom from red tape, from unions, from 
democracy itself. They want freedom from taxation, which, in turn, implies a 
loss of social services for others. The result of a loss of regulation for 
Monbiot is catastrophic. It means more pollution and lower air quality, a loss 
of civil rights, a loss of pay equity - indeed the loss of the entire structure of a 
decent civilization. 
 
In The Age of Consent, Monbiot challenges the very nature of the 
contemporary political order, calling it undemocratic from top to bottom. 
For him, the United Nations is directed by wealthy nations, the IMF and the 
World Bank are controlled by the same interests, and the World Trade 
Organization marches to the same drumbeat. Monbiot’s solution is to replace 
the present economic institutions with a new banking system. Harking back 
to John Maynard Keynes and his idea of an ‘International Clearing Union’, 
Monbiot argues that international banking requires a new basic structure that 
would provide a more just and equitable system by which nations could 
engage in the economic system : 
Keynes's system would, quite simply, maximize worldwide prosperity and 
level the power of nations. The ICU would entail no forced liberalization, no 
penal conditions on the poorest countries, no engineered opportunities for 
predatory banks and multinational corporations, no squashing of democratic 
consent. But the obvious question remains: how can the rich nations, 
especially the US, be made to accept it?371 
Monbiot’s argument is that the debt of poorer countries to the rich is so large 
that it outstrips the collective resources of the creditor nations. It is therefore 
in the best interests of rich nations to engage in a new form of economic 
practice. In a sense, ‘the poor owns the rich world’s banks’.372 Monbiot 
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proposes further radical changes – replace the WTO with a Fair Trade 
Organization (FTO) and democratize the United Nations. 
 
In an upcoming book, nominally titled Out of the Wreckage, Monbiot proposes 
more. Having documented so many of the ills of neoliberalism, Monbiot now 
argues for ways out of the present dilemma. A new political story is required, 
and one might argue, a new political theory, a large-scale philosophical and 
theoretical apparatus, that can confront the neoliberal story. In mainstream 
politics, this failure to produce a ‘new story’ is, to him, entirely obvious. The 
end of the left as a serious political force in the U.K., therefore, might be said 
to have happened at the moment of Blairism’s wholesale ingestion of 
Thatcherism. Corbyn is hardly the bearer of the left’s theoretical, or indeed 
political, hopes going forward into the future. The last convincing general 
‘story’ from the centre and the left was, according to Monbiot, John Maynard 
Keynes’ ‘General Theory’ : 
Outside of mainstream politics, there are thousands of new stories, which is 
part of the problem. There is a cacophony. No-one can hear any of them 
because everyone is shouting … so it all becomes unintelligible. What I am 
trying to do is to pull out the best of these ideas which have been devised by 
other people … some of which are total rubbish, some of which are pretty 
good, some of which are brilliant, finding the best ideas, and trying to weave 
those into a coherent political narrative … I try to get us a little bit further 
along the road to writing that new story.373 
6. Theory, the State and the Future : Preliminary Thoughts 
After this detailed review of some of the major state theorists of the last 
century, and having briefly glimpsed into the future of theorising about 
capitalism and the state, it must now be possible to set out some general 
conclusions that point to the future of state theory. Several preliminary 
remarks should help set the scene.  
 
First, this book has not attempted to provide an exhaustive account of state 
theorising. That exacting task may well be beyond the scope of any single 
individual. Nonetheless, while I have chosen a singular path through state 
theorists, it is also a path many others have also trodden – the texts are hardly 
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obscure for those writing in the field. And given the exhaustive coverage 
these theorists have, in turn, given to the broader state-centred literature, 
there is a wide range of sources to choose from in developing a proposal for 
a theory of the future.  
 
Second, it must be self-evident from all we read and understand, that, in spite 
of the utopian dreams of the right, and indeed, of the left of an earlier 
generation, the state has not withered away, but rather, has changed its 
structure and its purpose. It is hard to imagine, given the complexity of ‘late-
late capitalism’, that any such society could function without something like a 
state. Even in Michael Albert’s post-capitalist utopia, a structure I have 
referred to as a ‘grey state’, must persist. The question of whether capitalism 
needs something like a state to survive seems self-evident from the numerous 
historical examples presented, the most dramatic in recent years being the 
fiscal meltdown of the U.S. economy in 2008, which led the government to 
invoke the massive involvement of the federal state.  
 
Third, there is clearly, also, an obvious gap in state theory that many complain 
about, but no-one has been able adequately to fill. Part of this problem has 
been to do with the demise of the ‘master narrative’. With the death of Pierre 
Bourdieu in 2002, and with the earlier rise of the ‘New Philosophers’ in the 
late 1970s, a curse has been placed on all those who seek to create theories of 
everything, that try to explain how all states work, or how all knowledge 
works, or where the secret of modern economies might lie. It has thus been 
considered to be totalitarian even to attempt such a task, and thus theorists 
have hurried off to smaller, less ambitious, theoretical terrains.  
 
The problems of leftist state theory have not been a deterrent to theorists of the right. An 
argument rarely completely understood by the left is that the right have taken 
theory very seriously, and they have done so since the 1960s, with the rise of 
Milton Friedman and Frederick Hayek, whose intellectual work has provided 
a general theory of everything.  It has been celebrated and endorsed as a form 
of general explanation for all forms of human activity on a global scale. The 
‘Master Narrative’ of the right has been superbly successful. The general 
theory of neoliberalism has prevailed, in spite of massive evidence suggesting 
that its lies, its systematic exploitation of workers, the environment, and, 
most fundamentally, its attack on democracy, are fundamental to its 
character. Thus, while the left have been worrying about the possible 
hegemony of a general theory, the rightist theory of the state and economy 
has flourished, and not just in the think tanks of the right, but in the practices 
and purposes of capitalist economies, and therefore in the daily lives of 
ordinary people, worldwide. 
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Elements of a State Theory of the Future 
What, then, would an adequate theory of the state from the left require, as far 
as we can tell to date? I will briefly summarise what I take to be the essential 
elements of such an undertaking. 
 
1. The Necessity of History. Bourdieu’s magisterial attempt to provide 
progressive forces with an adequate account of the origins of the state is a 
magnificent, though incomplete, achievement. The ambition of the work – to 
dig back to the 12th century, to examine documents from early French 
history, from China, Japan and Britain, and then to trace the very earliest 
sources of state activity - is breath-taking. It is also essential work if we are to 
understand what the origins of our present condition might be. But it 
remains, first and foremost, an account of France. Bourdieu frequently 
insisted that he was not engaged in theorizing at all, but in providing 
generally applicable methodological tools for others to use in specific 
contexts, cultures and histories. His context was France, and thus, much 
remains to be done by others to bring forward historical accounts of other 
societies. He was proposing, as always, a programme of research. Further, his 
account almost wilfully ignores everything else besides the symbolic. No-one 
could accuse Bourdieu of being naïve about social class. His master-work 
Distinction put paid, once and for all, to any claims that might be made that he 
failed to understand the role of economic hierarchy and economic 
exploitation. Nonetheless, his account of the genesis of the state infers an 
economic history rather than openly evoking that history. For the rest of us, 
much remains to be done. It is clear that any new research program will 
require work on a theory of historical complexity that few have, to date, been 
willing to undertake. There may indeed be general patterns undergirding the 
rise of capitalism, as many have already argued, but it is also, clear, at one and 
the same time, that each society requires a contingent and context-specific 
theory of history of the kind that Bourdieu has produced for France, 
however incompletely. 
 
2. Dealing with the Complexity of the State. Not since Gramsci put pen to paper 
have we been able, with a straight face, to put forward the notion that the 
state is a simple instrument of capitalism. For political reasons, it might have 
suited early theorists to make such a blunt claim, but Gramsci’s theory of 
hegemony put to rest, once and for all, the idea that the use of brute force 
was a sufficient explanation to use to understand the power of the state. 
Poulantzas, with his extension of the Gramscian argument more self-
consciously into the realms of political and ideological state activity, further 
opened the doors to this complexity. Hall, and his emphasis on the cultural 
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turn, offered a new way of understanding how the state can capture the 
political common sense of an era. Bourdieu’s work on symbolic capital 
further extends the range of theoretical tools available to us to understand 
what is at stake within the state, and how this set of problems might be 
confronted. If we are not willing to confront the modern state in its fully 
complex condition, then we will not be able to understand how it operates. 
Thus any adequate account of the state in the future must live side-by-side 
with this complexity. And the precise nature of this complexity can only be 
revealed by detailed research. 
 
3. Facing the Complexity of the Citizenry. The problem of complexity does not 
end with the elaborate machinations of the state itself. Since the early days of 
Marxist theorizing, the working class has held centre stage in ruminations 
about the future. The dictatorship of the proletariat was still part of the 
central doctrine of the British Labour Party until the 1980s. But exploitation 
was never just about working men. The drastic exclusion of everybody else 
always meant from the start that Marxist theorising about politics, the state 
and the future was doomed to ignore most of the people it sought to 
implicate in its plans. At the present stage of capitalism, it is nothing short of 
absurd not to place the concerns of these ‘others’ at the centre of new 
theorizing. As George Monbiot comments, there is a cacophony of voices to 
be heard, not just from women and the women’s movement, not just from 
the various ethnic communities that have been excluded, not just from the 
LGBTQ communities, but also from a wide array of other communities 
never considered by Marxist arguments aimed solely towards the dictatorship 
of the proletariat. Issues surrounding the environment are now paramount to 
many on the left. The list of constituents and their concerns is substantial and 
complicated, and each sector has a series of demands that should reasonably 
be addressed in any future society that the left might contemplate. Thus any 
theory of the state attached to such hopes will need to develop a politics, not 
just of one sector or another, but a politics of the whole. 
 
4. The Need for a Theory of Praxis. Marx famously reminded us that the point of 
philosophy is not merely to understand the world, but that the point is to 
change it. This quotation374 has been widely misused to mean that theory is 
beside the point, and that action is paramount. Marx clearly didn’t understand 
                                                     
374 ‘Philosophers have merely interpreted the world in various ways ; the point is to 
change it.’ From Theses on Feuerbach, (Marx-Engels Collected Works, Volume 5, pages 3-
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https://socialistworker.org/2013/03/26/praxis-makes-perfect on April 7th., 2017. 
(Column of Todd Chretien, March 26, 2013.)  As Chretein rightly points out, the 
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praxis375 in this way, and the dialectic between theory and practice was central 
to his entire body of work, and to much of what followed from this 
beginning. Gramsci used the term, not merely as a smokescreen to avoid the 
censor’s pen, but also to speak to the dialectic that should exist continually 
between theoretical work and the work of experience. 
 
From the start, Gramsci was far more interested in changing the material 
conditions for workers than he was in rewriting the Marxist philosophical 
lexicon. But as he struggled with the issues of workers’ power, socialism, and 
the possibility of a socialist revolution, not to mention the rise of fascism, he 
never failed to return to the realm of theory in order to make sense of what 
he was experiencing. Action on its own is rarely enough. Armchair theorizing 
is aimless if the purpose is to change the world. Again, in Poulantzas’s 
contribution to theories of the state, there is a continual restlessness, a 
relentless dialectical movement between high theory and the talk of political 
possibilities, especially in Greece where some of his family still lived, as well 
as in France, where he wrote and worked. Class struggle is never far away 
from his concerns. Bourdieu’s desperation in the 1990’s, and his almost 
frantic efforts to create a philosophical and theoretical alternative to 
neoliberalism through his extensive research, activism, and organizational 
efforts spoke to the same compulsion – to be active in the world in order to 
change it, but also, as a sociologist of the future, to provide ‘scientific’ 
accounts, as he saw it, of what was going on in a more general way, above the 
fray of everyday experience but in debate with it, to use a newly formulated 
‘science’ in the service of political transformation. 
 
What does this mean for a theory of the state in the future? Clearly political 
theories of the future abound, as Monbiot has usefully explained already.  But 
clearly also what is needed is not just a ‘good story’, as Monbiot proposes, 
but a winning story, a story that combines the very disparate social publics – 
well beyond the traditional white, male proletariat – into a theory of the 
politics of the whole in a vision of the future. Thus a theory of praxis must 
get beyond the cacophony of voices and secure the common themes – 
equality, inclusion, justice – that can be at the heart of a new theory of the 
state, and a new theory of utopia. And this theory of the future must lead to 
the kind of widespread political action that is presently piecemeal, limited in 
                                                     
375 As will be familiar to most, praxis is traditionally a Greek term that refers to the 
process by which theory, ideas, lessons are turned into practice.  The term was first 
discussed by Aristotle and Plato, and the theme re-occurs in the writings of Kant, 
Marx, and others in the Marxist tradition.  Gramsci called Marxism the ‘philosophy of 
praxis’ to avoid the prison censors.  In Marxist terms, the use of the word raises a 
series of issues that connect political theory with political action.  
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time and space, and lacking coherence. 
 
5. The Fight to Understand and Capture the Common Sense. Is there still some 
common interest that might secure a common future? Stuart Hall has already 
brilliantly revealed for us the power of Thatcherism. In the wake of a failed 
Fordism, a Labourist strategy that had run out of money and that had lost the 
political will to live, Thatcher and her cronies took up the reigns, and began 
to deliver a new common sense, hopelessly inadequately, slowly, but with 
increasing momentum, to secure law and order, to get the rubbish collected, 
to have the trains run on time, to balance the budget, and to secure a new 
modernist strategy. A tiny little neo-colonial war in the Falkland Islands 
allowed perhaps the most unpopular Prime Minister in British history to stay 
in power and to bring about a partial revolution. Blairism took up the 
neoliberal baton and ran right into the branded, message-centred, media-
savvy world of Alistair Campbell, and the managing of the public message for 
the evolving ‘New Labour’ party. That this party under Blair’s leadership, 
captured the common sense of the era is without doubt, and they did so by 
merging market capitalism with a changing vision of the state, all packaged 
together to form a wholly nutritious and digestible diet for the feeding of the 
British public. By doing this, they may have captured the common sense of 
the day, but the Labour Party, aware of its infection from the political right, 
was seriously undermined. 
 
What is there, therefore, in the notion of a ‘common sense’ to be captured 
that is still worth fighting for? At one level, these elements of a common 
sense seem self-evident. Surely, one might reasonably propose, a majority of 
people want to live in a safe, stable and secure society, a stability founded on 
the basis of social justice? Was this not what Thatcher understood as the 
basic problem for Labour – their failure to secure basic services and stable 
social conditions? Instead, the Labour Party of the 1970s had delivered 
instability and social despair, continual strikes and a failure to deliver on 
health, wages and pensions. Is it not, therefore, a condition of any imagined 
advanced democratic society that there be good health care, a strong welfare 
net, a commitment to economic fairness, to gender equity, to ethnic 
inclusion, to religious liberty, to the separation of church and state, to 
support for gay rights and the rights of various communities of sexual 
identity? Is there always a common core of values that a majority of people 
might agree upon – stability, adequate health care, justice, free education – 
whatever the list might be?  Do not these principles seem self-evident as the 
basis for any decent society? Clearly there are neoliberal solutions to all these 
problems that can be set against state-driven solutions, but here we are 
talking about methods of implementation, rather than fighting over 
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fundamental values. Is there, therefore, a common sense worth fighting for, 
and does the left have a strategy for securing this common sense and for 
meeting these ambitions? I am not suggesting that there is some simple list of 
universal conditions that all societies might agree upon, but that, rather, in all 
societies, it is possible to talk meaningfully about a common sense that it 
there to be captured, even if the precise elements of this common sense will 
vary dramatically, from the progressivism of the Scandinavian social 
democracies to the neo-conservative qualities to be found in the United 
States. The work for social theorists and for sociologists is to identify this 
common sense, to examine which strategies might best secure the practical 
implementation of these values, and to ask whether the state can serve to 
guarantee these rights. Can the left capture this common sense, and develop 
theories, policies and practices that reflect them? While a facile analysis of 
Trump is to dismiss him as a rabid right-winger, with xenophobic views, with 
a long-standing history of sexual predation, and a narcissistic self-obsession, 
it is worth remembering that his campaign, if campaign it can be called, was 
aimed towards populism, the securing of a 19th century world for working-
class white males, and the women who still believed in that long-extinct 
world. Similarly, Bernie Sanders, the hope for most leftist aspirations in the 
2016 U.S. presidential election before he was derailed by Democratic Party 
shenanigans, was running on a populist ticket of bringing the banks to 
account, making the rich pay more taxes, developing a stronger health care 
and pension system, and providing better and more secure jobs for all. There 
was a common sense worth fighting for, and it was there for everyone, 
whether from the left or right, to see. 
 
6. Understanding the Hybridity of the Future. In Erik Olin Wright’s work on 
utopias,376 he discusses the challenges inherent in actually existing capitalisms, 
and points out the obvious error of imagining that in any given society some 
untainted and complete form of capitalism exists by itself. For Wright, the 
traditional challenge to capitalism that socialism once provided has now 
gone. In its place, Wright does not imagine that all hope is lost, but instead 
wants to suggest that any hopes for progress lie in another direction, and that 
moving in that direction requires an understanding of the hybrid nature of 
advanced societies. Wright allows, as many on the left do not, that non-class 
elements will play a major role in any social developments of the future, thus 
going well beyond orthodox class-based theories of socialism. But then he 
introduces the notion of hybridity, claiming that in all known societies there 
exists an amalgam of socialist elements, along with capitalist structures, 
household economies, non-profit systems, gift-giving, economic exchange 
                                                     
376 Envisioning Real Utopias, 2010, op.cit. 
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systems and several other possible ways of doing business and structuring 
social life. Wright thus characterises modern societies as hybrid systems, in 
which we experience, on a daily basis, a multiple set of ways of managing the 
life-world of citizens. Whatever the dominant economic, political and 
ideological structures that might prevail, a huge number of people live largely 
outside the doxa. This means the basic elements of cooperative life are present 
in any given social formation. And this means that ‘social empowerment’, the 
political capacities of the general public, are always potentially available to 
deliver a way of life closer to socialism. Thus Wright sees the state as part of 
the future, and he also sees a role for the market. This hybridity is a concept 
which, for Wright, more accurately reflects the world as it is much better than 
any neoliberal vision of free market purity, or dreams of a sanitised socialist 
utopia. If socialism is a remote prospect, as he claims, we must deal with the 
world as it is, warts and all, socialist, collectivist and capitalist at one and the 
same time. And if Wright’s depiction of the present situation is accurate, then 
the challenge for theorists of the state in the future is to deal with the hybrid 
nature of the existing social world, and to examine this complexity for 
possibilities. In hybridity, Wright sees hope and potentialities. Our present 
story about the nature of the existing social structures is hopelessly 
incomplete, and an understanding that accounts for hybridity comes closer to 
the mark. And if this is so, there is, in Wright’s thinking, both the challenge 
of seeking to analyse a far more complex society than we imagined before, 
but also to sense in that future, the possibilities for movement forward that 
we might have overlooked by ignoring hybridity. And this will require a way 
of explaining how the state will play its role in future undertakings. 
Thinking the Future 
In the end, is a radical social democracy, such as can be found in Scandinavia, 
the best we can do in the present phase of capitalist development, as Naomi 
Klein proposes? Can capitalism be regulated and controlled in order to meet 
the needs embodied in the best common sense of the day? Klein’s argument 
is that a mixed economy is the best possible alternative available to us in the 
present conditions. This means securing health, education, welfare and civil 
rights under the umbrella of the state, while other sectors of society operate 
in a (presumably regulated) free market. While there are many things to value 
in Scandinavia, have the ‘purer’ thoughts of a socialism beyond capitalism 
now disappeared? Not for everyone. Klein has been routinely criticised from 
the left for not proposing a social system beyond capitalism, and seeming to 
suggest that if we had a better, kinder, more fully regulated, market system, 
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then all would be well.377 Those committed to the overthrow of capitalism 
are hardly likely to be appeased by such theories of rapprochement. But if 
that is so, it remains for those on the most progressive edge of the left to 
suggest what this better world might look like, and how we might get there. 
In the meantime, the major discussions of the future are likely to centre on 
the ‘actually existing societies’ of Erik Olin Wright and Naomi Klein. 
 
But then history changes things against the odds. Changes that did not seem 
possible – the end of fascism in Europe, the end of apartheid, the overthrow 
of the Pinochet régime – a long list of impossible changes, changes against 
the odds, changes against violent and repressive régimes, changes for the 
better, progressive changes – seem to occur all the time. There is a 
restlessness in people, usually incoherent and unrealized, to seek a different 
and better world to inhabit, even if the precise details of that future are 
unclear. At the end of Gindin’s review of Klein’s This Changes Everything, 
Gindin comments : 
At the end of her book, Klein is about to interview the youthful head of 
Syriza, the radical Greek party now on the brink of taking power. She asks a 
Greek comrade what she should ask him, and the person answers: “Ask him: 
When history knocked on your door, did you answer?” As Klein concludes, 
“That’s a good question for all of us.”378  
And perhaps a poet, a seer of the future, ought to have the last word : 
 
History says don’t hope 
This side of the grave 
But then, once in a lifetime 
The longed-for tidal wave 
Of justice can rise up 
And hope and history rhyme.379 
                                                     
377 See ‘When History Knocks’, in Jacobin, 12.30, 2014, a review by Sam Gindin of 
Klein’s This changes everything: capitalism vs. the climate. New York, 2014, Simon and 
Schuster. The gist of the article is sympathetic, but suggests that Klein does not go far 
enough. 
378 Op. cit. The text is unpaged. 
379 Seamus Heaney, 1991. The cure at Troy: a version of Sophocles' Philoctetes. New York: 
Noonday Press.  Thanks to Jules Boykoff for introducing me to this poem. 
